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COMMENT

Pirates Incorporated?: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. and the Uncertain State of
Corporate Liability for Human Rights
Violations Under the Alien Tort Statute
JENNIFER L. KARNES†
INTRODUCTION
In September 2010, the Second Circuit issued a decision
that was coined the “death knell for most human rights
litigation against multinational companies in U.S. courts.”1
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the court ruled that
the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) could not be used to hold
corporations liable for human rights violations committed
abroad.2 ATS is a one-sentence jurisdictional provision that
allows foreigners to bring claims in federal court for torts
committed in violation of the “law of nations” or a treaty of
the United States.3 Since 1980, it has been used
increasingly as a means to hold perpetrators accountable for

† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2012, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.A., 2008, New
York University.
1. John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed., Shortening the Long Arm of the Law, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 2010, at 8.
2. 621 F.3d 111, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
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international human rights violations.4 Since the Kiobel
ruling, the District of Colombia Circuit in Doe VIII v. Exxon
Mobil Corp.,5 the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co.,6 and the Ninth Circuit in Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC,7 have sided with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
in Romero v. Drummond Co.8 and have ruled that ATS
imposes liability on corporate defendants for certain human
rights violations. During the October 2011 Term, the
Supreme Court heard arguments in Kiobel,9 but came short
of deciding once and for all whether ATS can be used to
impose liability on multinational corporations with
substandard human rights practices. Instead, in a rare
move, the Court ordered that the case be set for reargument
during the October 2012 Term on a more expansive issue,10
which was neither addressed by the Second Circuit, nor in
the Court’s prior ATS decisions. The Court’s consideration
4. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887-90 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding
that ATS grants sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction in human rights claims).
5. 654 F.3d 11, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
6. 643 F.3d 1013, 1018-19 (7th Cir. 2011).
7. Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, 09-56381, 2011 WL 5041927, at *11 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2011).
8. 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
9. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
No. 10-1491 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2012). The Supreme Court heard arguments in Kiobel
on the same day as Mohamad v. Rajoub, where the Court considered whether
the Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) permits suits against non-natural
persons. 634 F.3d 604 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 454 (2011). In
Mohamad, the widow and children of Azzam Rahim, an American citizen who
was tortured and murdered while in the custody of Palestinian Authority (“PA”)
intelligence officers, brought a suit under the TVPA against the respondents,
Jibril Rajooub, Amin Al-Hindi, Twfik Tirawi, the PA, and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (“PLO”). Id. at 605. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ action against the PA and the PLO on the
grounds that the TVPA permits actions against natural persons only. Id. at 609.
The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that “individual” as used in the statute did
not encompass organizations. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., No. 11-88, 2012
WL 1314011, at *3 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2012), aff’g Mohamad v. Rajoub, 634 F.3d 604
(D.C. Cir. 2011). It is clear that in analyzing Kiobel the Court will pay much
attention to the interplay between ATS and TVPA.
10. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012),
2012 WL 687061 (memorandum restoring case to calendar for reargument).
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of this more sweeping issue, whether ATS applies
extraterritorially,11 could potentially undermine all modern
ATS litigation as applied to both corporate entities and
individual defendants.
The issue of corporate liability under ATS has been
hotly debated. Corporate executives and pro-business
groups view ATS as a threat, and have actively sought to
quell the litigation. These groups believe that the surge in
ATS litigation will make it difficult for companies to do
business in places where human rights abuses occur, and
that ATS makes corporations the “surrogate for foreign
governments” primarily responsible for the abuse.12 Human
rights activists and plaintiff lawyers see the recent
explosion of ATS litigation13 as an important step in giving
human rights victims a forum to state their claims.14
Further, activists criticize the notion of immunizing a
“Pirates Incorporated”-type entity from liability for
egregious human rights violations, while at the same time
granting these entities many of the same rights as private
citizens, who would be liable for those same violations
under ATS.15 The Bush Administration viewed ATS as a

11. Id.
12. Nathan Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts From Overseas to U.S.
Courts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 2009, at A11.
13. Since 1980, the courts have issued 173 opinions in cases brought under
ATS. Julian G. Ku, The Curious Case of Corporate Liability Under the Alien
Tort Statute: A Flawed System of Judicial Lawmaking, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 353,
357 (2011). During the Bush administration, the courts issued about 150
decisions in ATS cases, more than three times the amount of cases decided
during the Clinton administration. JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS:
THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. COURTS 127-28 (2009).
14. See, e.g., Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2011), 2011 WL 6813566, at *2. (“The Brennan
Center for Justice at NYU School of Law respectfully submits this brief amicus
curiae in the hope that victims of alleged corporate wrongdoing in violation of
customary international law will continue to enjoy access to an Article III forum
of excellence capable of providing equal justice under law to the weakest of
victims, as well as to the most powerful of multinational corporations.”).
15. The title of this Comment and the reference to “Pirates, Incorporated” is
derived from a question Justice Breyer posed to counsel for Respondent at the
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threat to U.S. foreign policy goals,16 but the Obama
Administration has filed an amicus brief with the Court in
support of corporate liability.17
While the issue of extraterritorially was not raised in
Kiobel, the Court’s order has expanded the scope of review
in Kiobel to encompass issues raised by the other circuits. In
its order following oral argument, the Court requested that
the parties submit supplemental briefings to address the
issue of: “Whether and under what circumstances the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, allows courts to recognize a
cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States.”18 At the Kiobel argument, the Justices appeared to
be particularly concerned with using ATS to recognize a
cause of action for violation of the law of nations occurring
within the territory of another sovereign nation.19
Kiobel and the more recent case law suggests that the
courts are deeply divided on the question of whether ATS
can be used to impose liability on multinational
corporations. This Comment will (1) provide a history of
ATS; (2) analyze the recent circuit court opinions, with a
focus on the current outlier—Kiobel; (3) discuss the leading
arguments for and against the imposition of corporate
liability; (4) analyze the Supreme Court’s focus on recent
arguments from the Ninth and D.C. Circuits over whether
ATS can be applied extraterritorially to a suit between a
foreign corporation and an alien; and (5) argue that
Congress should clarify the scope of ATS. This Comment
Kiobel oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 25 (“Do you
think in the 18th century if they’d brought Pirates, Incorporated, and we get all
their gold, and Blackbeard gets up and he said, ‘Oh, it isn’t me; it’s the
corporation’—do you think they would have then said: ‘Oh, I see, it’s a
corporation. Good-bye. Go home.’”).
16. See DAVIS, supra note 13, at 128.
17. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 6-7,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2011), 2011 WL
6425363, at *6-7.
18. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012),
2012 WL 687061 (memorandum restoring case to calendar for reargument).
19. See infra Part V.
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will pay special attention to the courts’ varying
interpretations of the actions of the Nuremberg Tribunal
and the interplay between the Torture Victims Protection
Act (“TVPA”) and ATS. More specifically, this Comment
will focus on the extraterritoriality argument and whether
ATS requires that plaintiffs exhaust all remedies in the
country in which the alleged violation occurred. This
Comment is neither an endorsement nor a condemnation of
corporate liability. Instead, this Comment seeks to
demonstrate the judiciary’s struggle to interpret
international law as applied to ATS and call for
congressional guidance.
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. Filartiga Re-Awakens the “Legal Lohengrin”20
The concept of observing and construing the accepted
norms of international law, the “law of nations,” was
recognized at common law under the Articles of
Confederation, and later adopted in the Constitution.21 ATS,
the jurisdictional provision also known as the Alien Tort
Claims Act,22 was passed by the First Congress in the
Judiciary Act of 1789, as a means to implement the
constitutional mandate to uphold universally accepted
norms of international law.23 It gave federal courts
jurisdiction over tortious conduct that violates a treaty in
which the U.S. and the country where the tort occurred are
parties, or if the law of nations prohibits the act.24 There is
little surviving legislative history or record of congressional
20. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“This old but little
used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin . . . no one seems to know whence it
came.”).
21. Filartiga v. Pera-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1980); see also U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the [S]upreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”).
22. For purposes of clarity in this Comment, I will refer to the statute as
“ATS” exclusively.
23. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878-88.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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discussions about private actions that might be subject to
ATS jurisdiction.25 It has been inferred from the limited
historical record and the common law that the First
Congress intended to grant ATS jurisdiction over a limited
scope of actions: (1) violation of safe conducts, (2)
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and (3) piracy. 26
However, ATS was rarely invoked, and the judiciary did not
interpret it for nearly 200 years. In the sparse dicta, courts
continued to construe the law of nations as “excluding that
law which governs a state’s treatment of its own citizens.”27
In 1980, the courts’ construction of the law of nations
expanded significantly when the Second Circuit gave effect
to ATS in an opinion that Judge Kaufman called a “small
but important step in fulfillment of the ageless dream to
free all people from brutal violence.”28 In Filartiga, citizens
from Paraguay, who had applied for political asylum within
the United States, brought an action against another
Paraguayan citizen alleging that the defendant wrongfully
caused the death of plaintiff’s son by the use of torture. 29
Since the cause of action did not arise directly under a
treaty, the court had to decide whether the alleged conduct
violated the law of nations.30 The law of nations is
synonymous with customary international law (“CIL”),
which contains those norms that reflect a widespread state
practice,31 and a “‘settled rule of international law’ by ‘the
general assent of civilized nations.’”32 The courts often view
criminal law and tort law interchangeably in forming the

25. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004).
26. Id. at 715 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68).
27. Filartiga, 630 F.3d at 880 (citing Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31
(2d Cir. 1976); IIT, 519 F.2d at 1016-17).
28. Id. at 890.
29. Id. at 878.
30. Id. at 880.
31. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127 (2d Cir.
2010).
32. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
694 (1990)).
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basis for a cause of action in ATS cases.33 While a treaty
only binds its parties, CIL and jus cogens norms34 bind all
governments, including those that have not recognized the
norm, so long as they have not expressly and persistently
objected to its development.35 Because customary norms
derive from both criminal and civil law, there is little
meaningful distinction in ATS litigation between the two.36
Filartiga is significant in expanding the construction of the
law of nations from its eighteenth-century definition to its
conception “as it has evolved and exists among the nations
of the world today.”37 After examining various sources of
modern CIL, including the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, various treaties,
and judicial opinions, the court concluded that torture38 was
prohibited by the law of nations, and that the prohibition “is
clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction
between treatment of aliens and citizens.”39
B. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Expresses Concerns
Filartiga signaled the reawakening of ATS litigation in
U.S. courts, but the question of whether ATS could truly be
used to bring human rights violators to justice was fraught
with controversy from the beginning, both in the legal
community and the courts. In 1984, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit heard Tel-Oren v. Libyan
33. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582
F.3d 244, 257 n.7 (2d Cir. 2009).
34. A concept closely related to CIL in international law is jus cogens norms,
which are the norms “accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character.” Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened
for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
STATES § 102 cmt. d (1987).

OF THE

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE

36. See Talisman, 582 F.3d at 257 n.7.
37. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
38. The case dealt with official, state-sponsored torture. Id. at 878.
39. Id. at 884.

UNITED
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Arab Republic, where injured Israelis and family members
of deceased Israelis brought a claim against a group allied
with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (“PLO”),
alleging that the group committed murder and torture
during an armed attack of a civilian bus.40 While all
members of the judges’ panel affirmed the district court’s
decision to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,
the judges were sharply divided in their reasoning. It is
noteworthy to explore the divergence in opinions as the
judges’ arguments for and against ATS’s jurisdictional grant
continue to appear, and reappear, throughout human rights
jurisprudence. Judge Edwards expressed his agreement
with Filartiga and its holding that ATS “opens the federal
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by
international law.”41 However, he distinguished Tel-Oren on
factual grounds.42 Since members of the PLO are non-state
actors, “[a]bsent direction from the Supreme Court on the
proper scope of the obscure section 1350,” Judge Edwards
was unwilling to find that the law of nations extended to
persons not acting under the color of law, citing the lack of
international consensus on the matter.43
While endorsing Filartiga, Judge Edwards provided an
alternative interpretation of ATS in that it allows an alien
to bring a common law tort action in federal court without
satisfying the diversity requirement or jurisdictional
amount, so long as the tort was committed in violation of
international law.44 Pointing out that diversity jurisdiction
already allowed aliens to bring actions in the federal courts
if they satisfied the amount threshold, Judge Edwards
speculated that the drafters of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had
intended to maintain a federal cause of action for aliens
whatever the amount in controversy—in order to protect
them from the potential prejudices of the state court
system—since protecting the rights of aliens within the
40. 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 799 n.2.
43. Id. at 776.
44. Id. at 782.
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United States was of utmost foreign policy concern.45 Judge
Edwards concluded that under both the Filartiga and
alternative formulation plaintiffs need not “identify and
plead a right to sue granted by the law of nations.”46
Judge Bork, on the other hand, dismissed the case on
the ground that “[n]either the law of nations nor any of the
relevant treaties provides a cause of action that appellants
may assert in courts of the United States,”47 reasoning that
Congress’s grant of ATS jurisdiction did not, in itself, create
a cause of action that individuals could enforce in municipal
courts.48 Judge Bork found that the plaintiffs did not seek to
enforce a statutory nor a constitutional right, as required to
invoke the power of the court.49 Relying on (1) the political
question doctrine50—which contends that some issues, such
as foreign policy issues, are better left to the political
process than judicial intervention; and (2) the act of state
doctrine51—in which sovereign immunity precludes the U.S.
courts from inquiring into the validity of the acts of a
foreign sovereign in its own territory,52 Judge Bork further
reasoned that separation of powers principles prevented the
court from establishing a cause of action.53 Recognizing a
new cause of action, in Judge Bork’s opinion, would require
45. Id. Judge Robb responded that this alternative formulation could find no
support in the historical record, because in 1898, the “young, weak nation”
sought to avoid foreign entanglements. Id. at 821 (Robb, J., concurring). “A
refusal by a United States court to hear a dispute between aliens is much less
offensive to the states involved than would be an acceptance of jurisdiction and
a decision on the merits.” Id. Robb interpreted Judge Edward’s opinion to give
the courts the power to hear these types of cases between foreigners as an
“officious interloper and international busybody.” Id.
46. Id. at 788 (Edwards, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 801.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 803 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)) (noting that if it
were necessary to resolve the case, he would hold that the political question
doctrine bars the lawsuit).
51. Id. at 803-04.
52. See id. at 790-91.
53. Id. at 805.
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the court to analyze principles of international law that are
not clearly defined and may touch “sharply on national
nerves,” and create an exception to the general rule that
international law only binds state actors.54 Further, it
follows from Filartiga’s reasoning that if there exists an
individual right to bring claims under the law of nations,
then there also exists a cause of action for any violation of
the treaties to which the United States is a party.55 Bork
cautioned that this line of reasoning was absurd, because it
would mean, “all existing treaties became, and all future
treaties will become, in effect, self-executing when
ratified.”56 Bork also noted that there was no international
consensus on whether terrorism violated the law of nations,
that no treaty provided individuals with a right to seek
damages, and that at the time of the enactment of ATS, the
concept of international human rights law simply did not
exist.57 Bork concluded that “unless a modern statute,
treaty, or executive agreement provided a private cause of
action for violations of new international norms which do
not themselves contemplate private enforcement,” it was
not the role of the court to develop new causes of action
under ATS.58
Judge Bork contended that the Filartiga court’s
formulation of ATS would run contrary to the Constitution
by allowing the court to meddle in the other branches’
powers to decide matters of foreign relations under Articles
I and II.59 Following this reasoning, Judge Robb found that
the case could not be adjudicated on the basis of the political

54. Id. at 804-05 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
428 (1963)).
55. See id. at 820.
56. Id. A non-self-executing treaty is one for which Congress must enact
implementing legislation, while a self-executing treaty becomes the law of the
land and can be enforced in U.S. courts without any acts of Congress. See DAVID
WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS
897-900 (4th ed. 2009).
57. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810-16 (Bork, J., concurring).
58. Id. at 816.
59. Id. at 822.
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question doctrine.60 Judge Robb further warned that
adjudicating controversial foreign policy issues was a
slippery slope, given each nation’s differing notions of
terrorism, and that “each supposed scenario carries with it
an incredibly complex calculus of actors, circumstances, and
geopolitical considerations.”61 This debate over the foreign
policy implications of ATS jurisdiction persists today, and
appears in Kiobel as a basis for rejecting corporate liability.
Judges Bork’s and Robb’s concurrences were very
influential during the twenty-year period between Tel-Oren
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain.62 During this time, only the Second and Ninth
Circuits allowed ATS claims—other courts continued to rely
on Tel-Oren to conclude that ATS jurisdiction did not apply
over ATS plaintiffs’ alleged claims.63
C. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: The Supreme Court Finally
Speaks to ATS
Filartiga clarified that the adjudication of violations of
CIL norms falls within the ambit of federal jurisdiction.64 In
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court denied the
Government’s allegations that ATS was merely a
jurisdictional provision,65 finding that it was not a
“jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for the
use by a future Congress or state legislature that might,
some day, authorize the creation of causes of action.”66 Sosa
stated that the causes of action to which ATS jurisdiction
applies are drawn from the common law,67 and that the
modern day causes of action “rest on a norm of international
60. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 827.
62. See DAVIS, supra note 13, at 23-24.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
65. 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 694 (referencing (1) violation of safe conducts, (2) infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and (3) piracy).
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character accepted by the civilized world and defined with
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms.”68 The Filartiga court attributed the lack of
successful ATS suits to the fact that the jurisdictional
threshold is high, as the alleged tort must violate the “wellestablished, universally recognized norms of international
law.”69 ATS’s jurisdictional grant is distinguishable from
§ 1331 federal question jurisdiction,70 in that establishing
federal jurisdiction under ATS involved “a more searching
review of the merits,” than § 1331’s “arising under”
threshold.71 Addressing the issue cautiously, Sosa similarly
made it clear that ATS grants courts jurisdiction over a
limited number of causes of action, and that it was the role
of the courts to determine “whether a norm is sufficiently
definite to support a cause of action.”72 The Court further
instructed that the judiciary “should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any
international law norm with less definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when [ATS] was enacted”73—namely,
piracy, violations of safe conducts, and infringement on the
rights of ambassadors.74
Sosa instructs the courts to look to the sources of
international law that it has “long, [but] cautiously,
recognized.”75 These sources include works of jurors and
68. Id. at 725.
69. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887-88.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”).
71. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Filartiga, 630
F.2d at 877-78).
72. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 733. The judiciary’s use of comparative and international law has
been controversial among members of Congress, as well as members of the
federal bench. While internationalists argue that the reliance on foreign legal
materials is a long-standing American tradition, and is of particular importance
in the modern era of globalization, originalists argue that the U.S. Constitution
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commentators that reflect “the customs and usages of
civilized nations,” that courts must use “not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought
to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really
is.”76 While human rights instruments may accurately
reflect customary norms, they are not dispositive on
whether a tort violates the law of nations. In Sosa, the
plaintiff-petitioner alleged that his abduction constituted
“arbitrary arrest”77 within the meaning of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights78 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).79 The
Court found that since the U.N. Declaration was an
aspirational document, setting standards which states must
strive to achieve, it could not create a cause of action under
ATS.80 Further, although the United States is a party to the
ICCPR, the treaty is not self-executing, and thus, cannot
should be interpreted with sole reliance on domestic sources. See, e.g., Martha
Minow, The Controversial Status of International and Comparative Law in the
United States, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1 (2010), http://www.harvard
ilj.org/2010/08/on line_52_minow/; see also Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 471 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Supreme Court Associate
Justice Nominee) (“The Framers did not want Americans to have the rights of
people in France or the rights of people in Russia, or any of the other countries
on the continent of Europe at the time. They wanted them to have the rights of
Americans, and . . . I don’t think it’s appropriate to look to foreign law.”). But see
Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the at
the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265, 268 (2003)
(“International institutional issues cannot be treated as if they were exotic hothouse flowers, rarely of relevance to domestic courts. Those issues, when
relevant, must be briefed fully, with a comprehensive explanation of the legal
relationships between our Court and, say, the International Court of Justice.”).
76. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700
(1900)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77. Id.
78. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at 73 (Dec. 10, 1948).
79. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Mar. 23, 1976,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
80. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734.
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create enforceable obligations in federal court.81 The Court
held that arbitrary detention did not rise to the level of a
violation of international law, unless it was prolonged and
encouraged, or condoned as a matter of state policy.82
In addition to the requirement that the tort be a clearly
defined violation of CIL, Sosa suggests another criterion for
determining whether tortious conduct violates the law of
nations, “an element of judgment about the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in
the federal courts.”83 The Court suggests that the
exhaustion of domestic remedies and international criminal
tribunals may be potential considerations in appropriate
cases.84 In a footnote, the Court also suggests that foreign
policy concerns may be valid considerations in future cases,
and that there is a strong argument for “giv[ing] serious
weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact
on foreign policy.”85 Citing In re South African Apartheid
Litigation,86 where plaintiffs sought damages from a number
of corporations that allegedly participated in the apartheid
regime in South Africa, the Court noted that the postapartheid South African government raised concerns that
the case would interfere with the country’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission.87 The U.S. government agreed
81. Id. at 735 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 738 (“It is enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than
a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a prompt
arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well defined as
to support the creation of a federal remedy.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1986).
83. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732-33.
84. Id. at 733 n.21.
85. Id.
86. 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (holding that multinational corporations did not
violate international law for doing business with apartheid South Africa).
87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank
Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Penuell Mpapa Maduna, who was then
the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development for South Africa,
submitted an ex parte declaration to the district court, stating that the South
African government regarded these proceedings as interfering ‘with a foreign
sovereign’s efforts to address matters in which it has the predominant interest’
and asking that the proceedings be dismissed. After receiving the South African
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that the apartheid litigation would hinder foreign policy
goals.88
Justice Scalia’s concurrence fundamentally disagreed
with the majority’s discretion based framework.89 Relying on
the Erie Doctrine, which purports that there is no federal
body of common law,90 Scalia reasoned that “[t]he notion
that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of
states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to
control a sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens within its
own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist
law professors and human rights advocates.”91 Echoing the
separation of powers argument in Judge Bork’s concurring
opinion in Tel Oren,92 Scalia criticized, “[f]or over two
decades now, unelected federal judges have been usurping
declaration, the district court, sua sponte, solicited the views of the United
States Department of State. The State Department responded by submitting a
‘Statement of Interest’ asserting that ‘continued adjudication of the abovereferenced matters risks potentially serious adverse consequences for significant
interests of the United States.’”), aff’d sub nom. for lack of quorum, Am. Isuzu
Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008).
88. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. Pre-Sosa cases also referred to foreign policy
considerations in dicta. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (“The lack of clarity in, and
absence of consensus about, the legal principles invoked by appellants, together
with the political context of the challenged actions and the PLO’s impingement
upon American foreign relations, lead to the conclusion that appellants’ case is
not the sort that is appropriate for federal-court adjudication, at least not
without an express grant of a cause of action.” (emphasis added)).
89. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 739 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Ku, supra note 13,
at 355-56 (arguing that the manner in which courts have defined ATS in the
post-Sosa era lends support to Justice Scalia’s skepticism about the system of
judicial international lawmaking that is authorized by Sosa).
90. The Erie Doctrine is a fundamental rule of civil procedure arising from
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which held that a federal
court must apply the substantive law of the State, unless it is interpreting a
claim under the U.S. Constitution or federal law. Id. at 78.
91. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 749-50 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice
Scalia criticized further: “The Framers would, I am confident, be appalled by the
proposition that, for example, the American peoples’ democratic adoption of the
death penalty . . . could be judicially nullified because of the disapproving views
of foreigners.” Id. at 750 (citation omitted).
92. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801-08 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
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this lawmaking power by converting what they regard as
norms of international law into American law.”93
D. ATS Extends From Parties Acting Under the Color of
Law to Non-State Actors to Corporations
In Kadic v. Karadzic, decided in 1995, the Second
Circuit extended ATS liability to non-state actors, ignoring
Judge Edwards’s reservations that international law may
not impose individual responsibilities.94 Croatian and
Muslim citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought the action
against Radovan Karadzic, leader of the insurgent BosnianSerb forces, alleging that they were victims or
representatives of victims of atrocities committed as part of
the insurgent groups’ genocidal campaign in the course of
the Bosnian Civil War.95 The court disagreed with
Karadzic’s assertion that the plaintiffs failed to allege
violations of the law of nations, because such norms only
bind states, and not private individuals.96 Citing the
availability of private actions under the law of nations for
(1) piracy, (2) prohibitions against slave trades, and (3)
certain war crimes, the court concluded that “certain forms
of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by
those acting under the auspices of the state or only as
private individuals.”97
Cases brought under ATS often raise additional claims
under the TVPA.98 The TVPA establishes liability in tort for
“an individual, who under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation” subjects an individual to
torture or extrajudicial killing.99 Citing the TVPA’s

93. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring).
94. 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995).
95. Id. at 236-37.
96. Id. at 239.
97. Id.
98. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
99. Id.
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legislative history,100 the court explained that Congress
sought to codify the cause of action in Filartiga and extend
access to the remedy to U.S. citizens, as well as aliens.101
However, the Kadic court reasoned, “[t]he scope of the Alien
Tort Act remains undiminished by enactment of the Torture
Victim Act.”102 Thus, the court rejected defendants’
contention that the alleged violations of the law of nations
had to be the result of state action. The court concluded that
CIL’s proscriptions against (1) genocide, and (2) war crimes
extended to private individuals.103 Although torture must
exist under the color of law, the court found that the
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that Karadzic’s regime
was a state, and that he acted under the color of law for
purposes of international law requiring “official action.”104
Corporations effectively began becoming defendants in
ATS cases in 1997, when a California district court allowed
Burmese plaintiffs to proceed with their claims against the
Burmese government and an American oil company, Unocal
Corporation.105 Up until this point, the cases in which
plaintiffs brought claims against corporations were
dismissed on other grounds. Doe v. Unocal Corp. was the
first to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss.106 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit analyzed whether a “private party” could be
liable for the alleged jus cogens violations of murder,
torture, slavery, rape, and forced labor.107 Following the
precedent established in Kadic, the court analyzed (1)
whether the alleged tort required state action in order for
ATS liability to attach to it, and (2) if so, whether the

100. H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84,
86.
101. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 241-44.
104. Id. at 245.
105. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 897-98; see Ku, supra note 13, at 365.
107. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2002).
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private party engaged in state action.108 The court did not
analyze the issue of corporate liability specifically, but
instead found that Unocal Corporation could be liable as a
private party.109 The court, further, held that forced labor
was a modern form of slavery—to which the law of nations
attached individual liability—and thus, the defendant
company could be held liable for damages.110 Moreover, the
court concluded that Unocal could be found liable under an
aiding and abetting standard if they engaged in “knowing
practical assistance or encouragement that ha[d] a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”111
Since 1997, Exxon Mobil,112 Shell,113 Nestle,114 CocaCola,115 Occidental Petroleum Corporation,116 Caterpillar
108. Id. at 945.
109. Id. at 945-46.
110. Id. at 946.
111. Id. at 947.
112. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing
case brought by Indonesian plaintiffs alleging that defendant corporation had
contracted with a unit of the Indonesian national army to provide security for
their oil pipeline, and, in doing so, aided and abetted the military in its alleged
commission of genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, arbitrary detention,
extrajudicial killing, and sexual violence, on the grounds the plaintiffs failed to
sufficiently allege joint action by defendant corporation and the military).
113. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (allowing
case to proceed where plaintiffs alleged that Shell Nigeria recruited the
Nigerian police and military to attack local villages and suppress the organized
opposition to its development activity).
114. Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (dismissing
complaint against defendant corporations alleging that they aided and abetted
farmer’s engagement in forced labor of Malian children on cocao fields in Côte
d’Ivoir, on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to establish that corporations had
the requisite mens rea).
115. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2009) (dismissing
case where plaintiffs brought claims under ATS alleging that the Coca-Cola
Company had conspired with armed groups in the murder, torture, and
intimidation of Columbian union leaders).
116. Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal.
2005) (dismissing complaint that Colombian citizen plaintiffs brought against
the oil company and a private security firm that had allegedly partaken in the
bombing of a Colombian village, on the grounds that the case was barred by the
political question doctrine).
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Inc.,117 and the manufacturers of Agent Orange, inter alia,
have all been the subject of ATS litigation. In Vietnam Ass’n
for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., the
Second Circuit found that that the defendant manufactured
and distributed the herbicide Agent Orange primarily for
the purpose of destruction of crops, not to poison or target
human populations.118 Thus, the fact that Dow Chemical
supplied Agent Orange to the U.S. military for use in
Vietnam did not establish an actionable claim under ATS.119
In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., plaintiffs brought an action
against Pfizer Pharmaceutical Company, alleging that the
company performed involuntary medical testing of an
experimental antibiotic on children in Nigeria, without their
consent or knowledge.120 The court held that the CIL norm
prohibiting nonconsensual human medical experimentation
was enforceable by ATS.121 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari in both Agent Orange122 and Abdullahi.123
In Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd., plaintiffs
in three separate class actions brought claims against about
fifty multinational corporations, alleging that these
corporations had aided the South African apartheid regime

117. Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (relying on political
question doctrine to dismiss case brought by family members of Israeli
individuals who were killed or injured when Israeli Defense Forces used
bulldozers to demolish homes in Palestinian Territories, against bulldozer
manufacturer, alleging manufacturer knew that the equipment would be used
in violation of international law).
118. 517 F.3d 104, 119 (2d Cir. 2008).
119. Id. at 123.
120. 562 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 187; see also Recent Cases, Federal Statutes—Alien Tort Statutes—
Second Circuit Looks Beyond Complaint to Find State Action Requirement
Satisfied—Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L.
REV. 768, 773 (2010) (criticizing the court for looking beyond the trial court’s
factual record and determining that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged that
Nigeria was involved in the alleged events).
122. Viet. Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104
(2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1218 (2009).
123. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S.
Ct. 3541 (2010).
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in its commission of human rights violations.124 The court
found that plaintiffs could plead a theory of aiding and
abetting liability under ATS.125 On a petition for writ of
certiorari brought by defendant corporations, four members
of the Supreme Court recused themselves, due to their
economic interests in the defendant companies.126
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for
lack of quorum.127 The fact that many of the Justices have
shareholder stakes in the corporations that are sued under
ATS may be why the Court, until now, has been hesitant to
address corporate liability.
In Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., Sudanese residents brought an ATS claim against a
Canadian energy company alleging that the company, in an
effort to facilitate oil exploration activities, collaborated
with the Republic of Sudan’s government in its policy of
ethnically cleansing civilian populations.128 The Talisman
court altered the mens rea standard for aiding and abetting
human rights violations,129 finding that to satisfy the aiding
124. 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 2007).
125. Id. at 260.
126. See, e.g., Brief of KBR, Inc., as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents
at 29, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Feb. 2, 2011),
2012 WL 379577, at *29 (“By choosing to join certain corporate defendants,
plaintiffs may force the recusal of judges known to hold shares in those
corporations, in some instances coming close to selecting which judges will hear
their case.”).
127. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028, 1028-29 (2008)
(“[S]ince a majority of the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case
cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of the Court, the judgment is
affirmed under 28 U.S.C. § 2109, which provides that under these circumstances
the Court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the same court from
which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance
by an equally divided Court.”), aff’g for lack of quorum, Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
128. 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
129. While the Talisman decision is significant to the Second Circuit’s holding
in Kiobel, the “aiding and abetting” standard is its own, separate, controversial
issue that is beyond the scope of this Comment. For an in-depth discussion of
the issue of corporate complicity liability, see Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing
Effect of Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute
Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 222-32 (2008).
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and abetting standard, plaintiffs needed to demonstrate
that there was evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
that the defendant acted with the requisite mens rea to
provide substantial assistance in the commission of
internationally recognized human rights violations.130
However, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
case solely on complicity liability grounds, without passing
on the merits of whether corporations, themselves, could be
liable.131 The court, however, noted that “[t]his attenuation
between the plaintiffs’ allegations and the named defendant
(the only entity over which the district court had personal
jurisdiction) raises knotty issues concerning control,
imputation, and veil piercing (among other things).”132 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari.133 This case set the
groundwork for the Second Circuit’s decision in Kiobel.
Despite the number of cases brought under the ATS in
recent years, none of these cases has resulted in jury
verdicts ordering these multinationals to pay damages. In
2007 in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., a jury found Chevron not
guilty of allegations that it had aided and abetted in the
shooting of Nigerian villagers, who occupied an offshore oil
barge to protest its environmental record and hiring
practices.134 However, some corporations have paid large
settlements to avoid costly litigation. In 2004, Unocal
Corporation, an oil and gas company, settled with plaintiffs
for an undisclosed amount, after they were accused of
aiding atrocities committed by soldiers of Myanmar during
its construction of a pipeline in the country.135 In 2007,
Yahoo! settled with the family of two Chinese political
dissidents, who were jailed after Yahoo! supplied the
Chinese government with e-mail records.136 In 2009, while
130. Talisman, 582 F.3d at 260-61.
131. Id. at 268.
132. Id. at 261.
133. Talisman Energy, Inc. v. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 131 S. Ct. 122
(2010).
134. 621 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010).
135. Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6.
136. Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families, WASH. POST,
Nov. 14, 2007, at D4.
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denying any wrongdoing, Shell paid $ 15.5 million to settle
a case brought by Nigerians alleging human rights
abuses.137 The family members of Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was
hanged by the Nigerian military regime after protesting
Shell’s environmental practices, accused Shell of conspiring
to seek the government’s aid in silencing his criticism.138
Shell professed its innocence, but labeled the settlement as
a humanitarian act to compensate the families of the
victims.139
II. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM: THE END OF
CORPORATE LIABILITY?
A. The Majority Finds That No Norm of Corporate Liability
Exists in any Relevant Sources of Customary
International Law
Plaintiffs, who were residents of the Ogoni Region of
Nigeria, brought a class action complaint against
defendants Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (“Royal
Dutch”) and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC,
alleging that the defendant corporations aided and abetted
the Nigerian government in its commission of (1)
extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3)
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (4)
arbitrary arrest or detention; (5) violation of the rights of
life, liberty, security, and association; (6) forced exile; and
(7) property destruction.140 Plaintiffs were members of a
resistance group that opposed the defendant corporations’
oil exploration and production, and protested their
detrimental environmental effects.141 Plaintiffs alleged that
in the early 1990s, members of the Nigerian military
attacked their villages by shooting, killing, beating, and
raping Ogoni residents and destroying and looting
137. Jad Mouawad, Shell Agrees to Settle Abuse Case for Millions, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2009, at B1.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010).
141. Id.
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property.142 The plaintiffs contended that the defendant
corporations provided transportation to the military forces,
allowed their property to be used as a “staging ground for
[the] attacks,” and compensated the soldiers.143 The district
court dismissed four of plaintiffs’ claims, but sustained some
of the aiding and abetting claims and certified the matter
for an interlocutory appeal.144
Citing the series of corporate liability cases that had
been decided sub silentio,145 the court acknowledged:
“[T]here remain a number of unresolved issues lurking in
our ATS jurisprudence—issues that we have simply had no
occasion to address in the handful of cases we have decided
in the thirty years since the revival of the ATS.”146 Judge
Carbranes first explained that the subjects of international
law—i.e., individuals, as first recognized at the
International
Military
Tribunal
at
Nuremberg
(“Nuremberg”)—are determined by international law and
not the sovereign states.147 While it may seem logical to
assume that corporate liability exists under ATS because
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465-67
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). An interlocutory appeal occurs in the middle of a case, before a
final judgment:
When a district judge . . . shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order.
28 U.S.C § 1292(b) (2006).
Section 1292(c)(1) gives the Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from interlocutory orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1). In Kiobel, “[c]orporate
liability was not considered by the district court judge, was not raised by the
defendant, and was not briefed by anyone.” Marco Simons, Kiobel’s First Victim:
Flomo v. Firestone, EARTHRIGHTS.ORG BLOG (Oct. 5, 2010, 5:56 PM),
http://www.earthrights.org/blog/kiobels-first-victim-flomo-v-firestone.
145. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124 (citing Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5
(1974)).
146. Id. at 117. The court “decline[d] to address . . . [the] lurking question[ ]
. . . [of] whether the ATS applies ‘extraterritorially.’” Id. at 117 n.10.
147. Id. at 126.
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the notion of corporate liability is so firmly rooted in
American legal culture148 and domestic tort law, the court
noted that “the substantive law that determines our
jurisdiction under the ATS” is neither domestic law, nor the
domestic law of another country.149 Instead, the court found
that it was bound by Sosa to look to CIL to determine (1)
whether certain conduct leads to ATS liability, and (2)
whether the scope of liability under the ATS extends to the
defendant being sued.150 It was not sufficient for most or
even all “civilized nations” to recognize corporate liability—
rather, that norm had to come from international law. The
court further supported the proposition that the scope of
liability must come from CIL, not domestic law, by
referencing Khulumani, in which Judge Katzmann, in
concurrence, found that a domestic statute had no relevance
to his determination of whether aiding and abetting liability
was recognized under ATS.151
After explaining that the decision was guided
principally, and almost exclusively, by CIL, whose norms
were not meant to be created by U.S. courts unilaterally,
the court identified (1) international conventions, (2)
international custom, and (3) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations—the guideposts laid forth in
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice152—as the applicable sources of CIL norms.153 The
court looked first to international tribunals and concluded
that neither Nuremberg, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), nor the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) had
148. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117 & n.11 (noting that the idea that corporations are
“juridical persons” with duties, liabilities, and rights has been continually
recognized by the courts).
149. Id. at 117-18.
150. Id. at 128.
151. Id. at 130 (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254,
282 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring)).
152. Statue of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
153. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132.
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ever recognized corporate liability.154 The London Charter,
which
established
Nuremberg,
expressly
granted
jurisdiction over natural persons only.155 While the London
Charter also granted the tribunals the authority to declare
organizations criminal, the Court reasoned that this
provision was simply meant to allow for prosecution of
individuals who were members of organizations—i.e.,
members of the Gestapo and Nazi regime.156 Similarly, the
court relied on the United States Military Tribunals law
that allowed for prosecution of corporate executives, but not
the corporate entity itself for violations of international
law.157 Additionally, Nuremberg refused to impose liability
on I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (“I.G. Farben”),
a chemical manufacturer that knowingly supplied lethal
chemicals for use in the gas chambers at Auschwitz
concentration camp, along with other products that were
instrumental in the eradication of millions of people during
the Holocaust, “because crimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities.”158 The court
concluded that “in declining to impose corporate liability
under international law in the case of the most nefarious
corporate enterprise known to the civilized world, . . .
[Nuremberg] expressly defined liability under the law of
nations as liability that could not be divorced from
individual moral responsibility.”159 Additionally, the court
cited a report by the U.N. Secretary-General that defined
ICTY’s jurisdiction as extending to natural persons only,
and not juridical persons.160 Finally, the court looked to the
154. Id. at 136.
155. Id. at 133-34 (citing Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 270 [hereinafter London Charter]).
156. Id. at 134.
157. Id. (citing Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of
War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945).
158. Id. at 134-35.
159. Id. at 135.
160. Id. at 136 (citing U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General
Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, art. 6, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (May 3, 1993)).
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Rome Statute, which also limited the ICC’s jurisdiction to
natural persons.161
The court noted that a treaty could only be evidence of a
CIL norm if it were ratified by an “overwhelming majority
of states” who “consistently act in accordance with its
principles,”162 such that its norms bind states that have not
ratified the treaty. Although recent specialized treaties163
have recognized corporate liability, the court reasoned that
this liability was in the context of the treaties’ subject
matter, and not the broader context of human rights
violations.164 The court noted that treaties do not necessarily
codify existing norms of CIL.165 Additionally, reading the
aforementioned treaties to construe a CIL norm of corporate
161. Id. at 136-37 (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
art. 25(1), opened for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, 105 [hereinafter
Rome Statute]).
162. Id. at 137 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
163. The court referenced the treaties relied upon by the Talisman district
court as evidence of corporate liability under CIL. Id. at 138 n.40 (citing
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 289, 31617 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)). The treaties included:
(1) Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, adopted July 1, 1949, 96
U.N.T.S. 257 (not ratified by the United States); (2) Convention on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, done July 29,
1960, amended Jan. 28, 1964, 956 U.N.T.S. 251 (not ratified by the
United States, China, the Soviet Union, or Germany); (3) International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 29,
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 (not ratified by the United States, China, or the
Soviet Union); (4) Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, done May 21, 1963, 1063 U.N.T.S. 265 (not ratified by the
United States, China, France, Germany, or the United Kingdom); (5)
Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage
of Nuclear Material, done Dec. 17, 1971, 974 U.N.T.S. 255 (not ratified
by the United States, China, the Soviet Union, or the United Kingdom);
and (6) Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral
Resources, done Dec. 17, 1976, reprinted at 16 I.L.M. 1450 (signed by
six States but ratified by none).
Id.
164. Id. at 138.
165. Id. at 139.
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liability would run contrary to other treaties’ express
rejection of corporate liability.166 The court reasoned that
even if an overwhelming number of states had ratified these
treaties, they “have not had such influence that a general
rule of corporate liability has become a norm of customary
international law.”167 Finally, the court looked to subsidiary
sources of CIL, relying on the declarations of Professor
James Crawford and Professor Christopher Greenwood,
experts in the field of international law, whose legal
scholarship discusses the lack of any notion of corporate
liability in either criminal or civil international law.168
In its conclusion, the court explained that it was
unwilling to recognize corporate liability under ATS,
because corporate liability had simply not risen to the level
of a “specific, universal, and obligatory” norm encompassed
in “the law of nations.”169 Still, the court warned that the
decision did not give corporate entities carte blanche.170 The
majority clarified that corporations could still be held
responsible under another body of law, and that “nothing in
the opinion limits or forecloses suits under the ATS against
a corporation’s employees, managers, officers, directors, or
any other person who commits, or purposefully aids and
abets, violations of international law.”171 Under the courts’
current interpretation of ATS, the scope of liability and the
causes of actions that it encompasses are constantly
evolving. While Kiobel found that, today, there exists no
norm for corporate liability for human rights violations in
customary international law, it acknowledged “that
customary international law is not a ‘static’ body of law
incapable of evolution or growth,”172 and that it was possible
for a norm of corporate liability to ripen.173 This analysis
166. Id
167. Id.
168. Id. at 142-43 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 148-49.
170. Id. at 149.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 141 n.43.
173. Id. at 149 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)).
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leaves the door open for the recognition and development of
such a norm.
B. Judge Leval: “The majority opinion deals a substantial
blow to international law and its undertaking to protect
fundamental human rights.” 174
Judge Leval, concurring in judgment only, wrote an
opinion sharply critical of the majority’s reasoning.175 His
opinion drew on a series of hypotheticals involving
“extraordinarily abhorrent conduct”176 to illustrate that the
majority’s opinion contains internal inconsistencies, and
that its holding could have disastrous consequences in
stagnating the progress of international human rights.
Through his “parade of horribles,” Judge Leval opined that
under the majority’s rule, gross violators of human rights,
such as the operators of the Nazi extermination camps,
could completely escape liability by incorporating.177 Judge
Leval warned that the majority rule gives corporations an
incentive to exploit cheap labor, while providing a shield
from any responsibility.178 Judge Leval critiqued the
majority’s contention that corporate executives, but not the
entity itself, could be held liable for human rights
violations.179 Judge Leval found this reasoning flawed on the
basis that there is no universally accepted norm for tort
liability in general—neither for individuals nor entities—
thus, he argued, no right to tort damages could exist under
ATS for natural persons either, which runs contrary to Sosa
and existing precedent.180
Judge Leval distinguished the I.G. Farben case, relied
on by the majority, on the grounds that Nuremberg was
established to impose criminal, and not civil, sanctions on
174. Id. (Leval, J., concurring).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 158-59.
177. Id. at 150.
178. See id. at 158-59.
179. See id. at 179.
180. Id. at 152.
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offenders.181 Thus, the fact that I.G. Farben’s executives
were tried for their exploitation of slave labor at the Nazi
camps as individuals and not as a corporate entity was not
dispositive on the issue of corporate civil liability.182 Other
historians have explained that Nuremberg did, in fact,
intend to try corporations directly, and have suggested that
the failure to do so was “a result of a combination of factors,
including Allied interest in maintaining the German
economic structure, the weariness of ‘awakening legal
concerns’ with a somewhat controversial and novel legal
move, and the evidentiary difficulties of prosecuting entities
with complex structures.”183 This differing interpretation of
the historical record illustrates the inherent flaw in the
court’s reliance on imperfect sources of international law to
determine whether a claim can be brought in federal courts.
Judge Leval argued that the majority’s reliance on the
statutes of the international tribunals was flawed, because,
to date, these tribunals have only focused on criminal
punishment.184 Rejecting the majority’s contention that
181. Id. at 155-56.
182. Id. at 155; see Tyler Giannini & Susan Farbstein, Corporate
Accountability in Conflict Zones: How Kiobel Undermines the Nuremberg Legacy
and Modern Human Rights, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 119, 122 (2010),
http://www.harvardilj.org/2010/11/online_52_giannini_farbstein/ (“The Kiobel
majority misinterpreted the historical record by relying on I.G. Farben to
support its assertion that because the corporate entity itself was not prosecuted
criminally at Nuremberg, there is no international consensus that corporations
can be held accountable for violations of international law. . . . Farben received
the ultimate penalty when the Allied Control Council ordered it dissolved
through Control Council Law No. 9. Thus, the example of I.G. Farben
demonstrates that international law has long held corporate entities
accountable for egregious violations in conflict zones.” (citations omitted)); see
also Gwynne Skinner, Nuremberg’s Legacy Continues: The Nuremberg Trials’
Influence on Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 71 ALB. L. REV. 321, 364 (2008) (“[T]he growth of multinational
corporations over the last twenty-five years, the manner in which they operate,
and the lack of safeguards ensuring good corporate governance, justify and
provide strong support for holding corporations liable under Nuremberg’s
standards.”).
183. Ku, supra note 13, at 381-82 (citing Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of
Corporations and Conspiracy in International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg
Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1198-99 (2009)).
184. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163 (Leval, J., concurring).
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there is no distinction between civil and criminal liability
under international law, Judge Leval criticized the majority
for comparing apples to oranges, particularly when our legal
culture makes clear distinctions between civil and criminal
law185: “The reasons why the jurisdiction of international
criminal tribunals has been limited to the prosecution of
natural persons, as opposed to juridical entities, relate to
the nature and purposes of criminal punishment, and have
no application to the very different nature and purposes of
civil compensatory liability.”186 Judge Leval contended that
this distinction simply means that the international
community has chosen not to punish corporations criminally
because imposing criminal liability would fail to meet the
objectives of criminal punishment.187 It was logical, Judge
Leval reasoned, that the international community would
instead choose to impose civil liability on corporations—
entities that would be better equipped to compensate
victims, than individual defendants.188 He reasoned that
because “major instruments that codify the humanitarian
law of nations define forms of conduct that are illegal under
international law, and obligate States to take appropriate
steps to prevent the conduct,” the international community
did not require the availability of civil remedies.189 As prior
ATS case law has explained, “[w]hat is a crime in one
jurisdiction is often a tort in another jurisdiction”190—
international law does not draw clear distinctions between
the two.
The judge argued that the majority’s rule would pervert
the long-recognized jurisdiction of ATS over one of the
eighteenth-century paradigms—piracy—by not allowing
claims against the seizure of a vessel owned by a
corporation, as corporate entities have neither a right to a

185. Id. at 169.
186. Id. at 166.
187. Id. at 170.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 173-74 (footnote omitted).
190. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002).
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remedy, nor an obligation under international law.191
Similarly, said Judge Leval, corporations could commit acts
of genocide without any civil liabilities.192 Judge Leval
suggested that the majority rule is nonsensical because the
international community has no interest in advancing a
rule that allows corporations to escape liability and no
shared objective in recognizing it.193
The concurrence contended that there is no precedent
for the majority’s decision, relying on the string of prior
caselaw involving ATS suits against corporations, in which
the court did not pass on the merits of corporate liability
under the statute.194 Judge Leval relies on two Attorney
General opinions—(1) a 1907 opinion that an American
corporation could be liable under ATS to Mexican nationals
for diversion of the waters of the Rio Grande,195 and (2) a
1795 opinion by Attorney General William Bradford that a
British corporation could pursue a civil action under the
ATS for injury caused to it in violation of international
law196—to conclude that there is precedent for corporate
liability.197
Finally, Judge Leval interpreted footnote twenty of the
Sosa opinion, which read that “[a] related consideration is
whether international law extends the scope of liability for a
violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or
individual,”198 to imply that private actors and corporations
were to be treated identically.199 The majority had
interpreted this language to mean that the two were to be
treated differently.
191. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 156-57 (Leval, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 157.
193. Id. at 157.
194. Id. at 161 n.12.
195. Id. at 162 (citing Mexican Boundary—Diversion of the Rio Grande, 26 Op.
Att’y Gen. 250, 253 (1907)).
196. Id. (citing Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)).
197. Id.
198. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
199. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 165 (Leval, J., concurring).
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III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DENIES PANEL AND EN BANC
REHEARING IN KIOBEL
On February 4, 2011, the Second Circuit further
affirmed its decision in Kiobel when it denied appellants’
petition for panel rehearing.200 Yet, the court also spilt fiveto-five as to whether to proceed to en banc rehearing.201
Writing for the dissent to the denial for rehearing en banc,
Judge Lynch wrote “the panel majority opinion is very likely
incorrect as to whether corporations may be found civilly
liable under the Alien Tort Statute.”202
A. Chief Judge Jacobs Opines Kiobel Arrived at a “Sound
and Elegant” Decision203
In the opinion denying panel rehearing, Chief Judge
Jacobs and Judge Cabranes filed concurring opinions, and
Judge Leval dissented. Calling Judge Cabranes’s Kiobel
opinion a “sound and elegant” one, Judge Jacobs criticized
Judge Leval’s opinion as being overly academic, and
subjected it to “some tests of reality.”204 First, Chief Judge
Jacobs points out that Judge Leval fails to address whether
200. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 269 (2d Cir.)
(memorandum denying panel reh’g), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011).
201. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir.)
(memorandum denying en banc reh’g), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). Chief
Judge Jacobs concurred in the denial, and Judges Lynch, Pooler, Katzmann,
and Chin all dissented. Id. Judge Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., an Obama appointee
sworn in on February 4, 2011, did not vote on the petition for rehearing en banc.
Second Petition for Re-Hearing En Banc For Plaintiffs-Appellants-CrossAppellants at 2, Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv). On
February 17, 2011, appellants filed a second petition for en banc rehearing,
contending that under the court’s Internal Operating Procedure 35.1(b) all
judges active on the date of entry of an en banc order, including Judge Lohier,
were entitled to vote on the petition. Id. at 2-4. Appellants requested that Judge
Lohier be polled, as his vote in favor of en banc rehearing would lead to an en
banc decision. Id. This second petition, however, was denied on March 1, 2011.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No.
10-1491 (U.S. June 6, 2011).
202. Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 380 (en banc reh’g denial) (Lynch, J., dissenting).
203. Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 269 (panel reh’g denial) (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
204. Id.
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the remedy embodied in ATS is consistent with
international law.205 While the prohibition of a particular
crime might rise to a level of international concern such
that it becomes a CIL norm, Jacobs pointed out, there is no
international consensus on the punishment.206 Using
international disagreement over the death penalty as an
example, Jacobs cited to instances in which Europe has
refused to extradite criminals to the United States that may
face death row.207 Judge Leval responded that, while
international law does not specify the remedies for
violations of CIL norms, it does give each nation the
freedom to proscribe whichever remedy they wish.208
Chief Judge Jacobs contended that ATS litigation could
be particularly divisive in the realm of foreign policy. 209
Referring to the courts’ interpretation of ATS as “judicial
imperialism,” Chief Judge Jacobs raised concerns that other
countries would be unreceptive to adjudicating these
matters in foreign courts, as was the case in the postApartheid South African litigation.210 Chief Judge Jacobs
noted that each country has an economic stake in protecting
and regulating the companies operating within its borders,
and that this explains “why no international consensus has
arisen (or is likely to arise) supporting corporate liability.”211
Finally, Chief Judge Jacobs reasoned that because of
Talisman’s heightened mens rea standard,212 it would be
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. (“The pirate is the enemy of all mankind and offends international
norms that are universal among civilized countries; so the United States should
have no trouble achieving extradition of a pirate. But if the remedy in this
country entails capital punishment, one would soon see that other nations have
a lively interest in the processes and remedies afforded under United States
law, an interest apart from bare classification of piracy as a violative of a norm
of customary international law.”).
208. Id. at 277 (Leval, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d
244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009).
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difficult for cases against corporations to survive without
proof that the corporate entity acted with the intention of
violating CIL.213 Thus, “[t]he incremental number of cases
actually foreclosed by the majority opinion in Kiobel
approaches the vanishing point.”214 Instead, according to
Chief Judge Jacobs, Kiobel has the effect of preventing ATS
from becoming an instrument of extortion—i.e., preventing
meritless claims brought under creative pleadings to
proceed through discovery, or lead to coerced, multi-million
dollar settlements.215 Further, Chief Judge Jacobs raised
concerns that the discovery process could reveal corporate
strategy and trade secrets, and provoke “bad public
relations or boycotts.”216
B. Judge Leval Criticizes the Majority for Letting Policy
Dictate Their Decision
Judge Leval criticized Chief Judge Jacobs for allowing
an “intense, multi-faceted policy agenda” to infiltrate his
opinion.217 He opined that it is not the role of the courts to
adjudicate policy matters, and that many of Chief Judge
Jacobs’s policy criticisms, while valid, apply to ATS
litigation generally, instead of to corporations specifically.218
Calling the majority’s opinion “substantial overkill,” Judge
Leval reasoned that the categorical exemption of
corporations from ATS suits is improper, and that the
courts have gate-keeping machinery in place to prevent
frivolous suits from proceeding to discovery, and to curtail
excessive jury verdicts.219 Judge Cabranes, the author of the
underlying decision’s majority opinion, rejected Judge
Leval’s accusations that the decision stems from policy
choices; he reiterated that the majority’s decision was
formed in accordance with Sosa, and that corporate liability
213. Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 271 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 272 (Leval, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 273.
219. Id. at 274.
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has simply not been defined as a “specific, universal, and
obligatory” norm.220
Judge Leval repeated his warning that Kiobel
incentivizes businesses to incorporate in order to shield
themselves from liability.221 While Chief Judge Jacobs
opined that I.G. Farben was one of few companies in history
that have engaged “in the atrocity business,”222 Judge Leval
responded that he did not share in this confidence that
other companies would not utilize the protections provided
by the corporate form.223 Judge Leval referenced the fact
that Somali pirates have organized into “limited, profitsharing partnerships so as to secure investments in their
operations,” and cited to the recent explosion in outsourcing
of military operations to private contractors; Kiobel could
allow these militaries to “contract their services to despots
and others for the conduct of dirty business.”224 Rejecting
separation of powers and foreign policy arguments, Judge
Leval called “Judge Jacobs’ reliance on his perception of the
foreign policy of the United States . . . inappropriate . . . to
justify far-reaching rulings that narrow the scope of the law
of nations without any guidance from the departments of
government.”225 Judge Leval conceded that deference to
opinions of the executive branch may be appropriate on a
case-by-case basis, but noted that the Second Circuit “did
not seek guidance from the Department of State” in
Kiobel.226

220. Id. at 272 (Cabranes, J., concurring) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
221. See id. at 275 (Leval, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Jacobs, C.J., concurring).
223. Id. at 275 (Leval, J., dissenting).
224. Id. Some support for Judge Leval’s argument can be found in what Julian
Ku refers to as the “third wave” of post-9/11 ATS litigation, in which alien
plaintiffs have brought claims against the U.S. Government for its military’s
anti-terrorism activities, alleging, inter alia, torture at its Guantanamo Bay and
Abu Ghraib detention facilities. See Julian G. Ku, The Third Wave: The Alien
Tort Statute and the War on Terrorism, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 105, 110 (2005).
225. Kiobel, 642 F.3d at 276 (Leval, J., dissenting).
226. Id.

858

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

IV. OTHER CIRCUITS SUPPORT THE IMPOSITION OF CORPORATE
LIABILITY
The courts that have ruled in favor of corporate liability
have arrived at their decisions through several different
analyses. The Eleventh Circuit, the first to recognize that
corporations could be properly named as defendants in ATS
suits, simply reasoned that there is no language in the
statute expressly exempting corporations.227 The Seventh228
and D.C.229 Circuits, however, found that while CIL defines
the substantive causes of action, it does not define which
parties could be properly sued under ATS. Further, these
Circuits found support for corporate liability in the
historical record. The Ninth Circuit, like the Eleventh,
noted that nothing in the statute itself suggests a bar to
suits against corporations.230 The Ninth Circuit, however,
found that determining whether a corporation could be sued
under ATS involves a claim-by-claim inquiry into the scope
of liability of private actors for each alleged violation i.e.,
CIL may recognize corporate liability for one alleged
violation, like genocide, but not for another, like racial
discrimination.231 Additionally, the splintered Ninth and
D.C. Circuit opinions raised a bevy of new issues that were
not addressed in Kiobel, such as the exhaustion of remedies,
extraterritoriality, and universal jurisdiction. Specifically,
the Ninth Circuit’s feverish dissents called into question
whether Congress intended the ATS to apply to activities
that occur within a foreign country (extraterritorially), and
whether ATS imposes liability on those who merely aid and
abet the human rights violations of others.232

227. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
228. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015-17 (7th Cir.
2011).
229. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
230. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011).
231. Id. at 755-63, 768-70.
232. See infra Part IV.D. While there is an obvious interplay between
corporate liability and aiding and abetting liability, it will not be addressed at
length in this Comment.
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A. Romero v. Drummond Co.
In Romero v. Drummond Co., plaintiffs brought an
action against Drummond, Ltd., a U.S. mining company,
alleging that its president Augusto Jimenez, with the
knowledge of U.S. corporate executives, hired paramilitaries
to torture leaders of the Sintramienergetica union.233 These
claims were brought under both TVPA and ATS.234 While
the court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the case on
the basis of evidentiary and discovery issues, the court
rejected the company’s arguments that ATS and the TVPA
do not permit suits against corporations.235 Without much
analysis, the court found:
Because the Alien Tort Statute is jurisdictional, we must address
the argument of Drummond about corporate liability under that
statute. The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no express
exception for corporations, . . . and the law of this Circuit is that
this statute grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against
236
corporate defendants.

The Romero court contended that it was bound by its
decision in Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce.237 However,
233. 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). The violence at issue in the case
takes place within the context a four-decade long Colombian civil war, and a
right-wing paramilitary movement to suppress labor unions. Since the 1986
formation of the Central Unitaria de Trabajadores de Colombia, the largest
trade union confederation in Colombia, over 4000 trade unionists have been
murdered. Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 2, Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303
(11th Cir. 2008) (No. CV-03-BE-0575-W), 2003 WL 24083752. U.S. corporations
have previously been linked to anti-union violence in Colombia. Even more
prominently, Coca-Cola came under scrutiny for its alleged role in anti-union
activity. In Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., plaintiffs brought claims under ATS
alleging that the Coca-Cola Company had conspired with armed groups in the
murder of a local union leader that occurred inside a Coca-Cola bottling facility,
as well as the torture and intimidation of other union leaders. 578 F.3d 1252
(11th Cir. 2009). The case was dismissed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision to dismiss the ATS claims on the basis that it failed
under the Twombly pleading standard. Id. at 1268.
234. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1309.
235. Id. at 1314-15, 1324.
236. Id. at 1315 (internal citation omitted).
237. Id. at 1316 (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 416 F.3d 1242
(11th Cir. 2005)).
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while Aldana allowed ATS claims against corporations to
proceed, the case did not directly address corporate
liability.238 While Aldana does, in fact, support Romero’s
holding that TVPA was not the exclusive cause of action for
a torture claim, and that bringing a claim under TVPA did
not preclude bringing a claim of torture under ATS,239 the
case provides no analysis for why the court may recognize
corporate liability under ATS.
B. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.
In Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., plaintiff-appellants
alleged that Exxon retained members of the Indonesian
Army to guard its natural gas facility, even though Exxon
was aware that the army had committed human rights
violations in the past, and knew their performance of the
security contract would lead to human rights violations
against the residents of Aceh.240 In its lengthy 120-page
opinion written by Judge Rogers, the majority ruled that
ATS applied extraterritorially, and that “aiding and
abetting liability is available under the ATS” for those
defendants that meet the “knowledge” mens rea standard.241
In addressing corporate liability, the Exxon court first
reasoned that CIL does not provide the rule of decision for
determining whether corporate liability exists under ATS.
The court opined that Kiobel erred in “conflat[ing] the
norms of conduct at issue in Sosa and the rules for any
remedy to be found in federal common law.”242 According to
the court, Sosa only addressed the fact that the “substantive
content of the common law causes of action that courts
recognize in ATS cases must have its source in [CIL].”243
While CIL “provides rules for determining whether
international disapprobation attaches to certain types of
238. Aldana, 416 F.3d at 1242.
239. Id. at 1250.
240. 654 F.3d 11, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
241. Id. at 20.
242. Id. at 41.
243. Id.
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conduct,” it does not provide rules for determining
procedural obligations.244 The court reasoned that the
“technical accoutrements to the ATS cause of action” are
“drawn from federal common law.”245 Relying on the
explanation of Professor Louis Henken, the court noted
that: “International law itself . . . does not require any
particular reaction to violations of law . . . . Whether and
how the United States should react to such violations are
domestic, political questions . . . .”246 Thus, the fact that CIL
provided no right of action to sue corporations did not
establish corporate immunity under ATS. Further, Kiobel,
said the court, misread footnote twenty of Sosa as
establishing corporate immunity, when in actuality, the
footnote merely referenced the dichotomy between
international law as applied to state and non-state actors.247
International law, the majority said, recognizes that
“corporate legal responsibility is part and parcel of the
privilege of corporate personhood.”248
The Exxon court reasoned that the historical
underpinnings of ATS demonstrate that corporate liability
is permissible.249 In 1781, the Continental Congress adopted
a Resolution that would be a “direct precursor of the [ATS],”
requesting each state to establish remedies for violations of
the law of nations.250 One rationale for this Resolution, the
court explained, had its basis in a case where Chevalier De
Longchamps, a French citizen, assaulted Francis Barbe
Marbois, a French Consul General in Philadelphia.251 While
De Longchamps was eventually prosecuted in Pennsylvania
244. Id. at 43.
245. Id. at 51.
246. Id. at 42 (quoting LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
STATES CONSTITUTION 245 (2d ed. 1996)).

AND THE

UNITED

247. Id. at 50.
248. Id. at 53.
249. Id. at 26.
250. Id. at 44 (quoting Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the
Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 461, 477 (1989)).
251. Id. at 44 (citing Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111
(O.T. Phila. 1784)).
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state court for a violation of the law of nations, the federal
government “struggled to respond to an international
incident over which [it] had no authority.”252 Accordingly,
“[t]he Judiciary Act of 1789 ensured that there would be no
gap in federal subject matter jurisdiction with regard to
torts in violation of treaties or the law of nations.”253 Under
this historical context, Judge Rogers reasoned that it would
have been nonsensical for Congress to be “concerned with
the risk that natural persons would cause the United Sates
to be drawn into foreign entanglements, but [to be] content
to allow formal legal associations of individuals, i.e.,
corporations, to do so.”254 Further, the majority argued,
corporate liability in tort was an accepted principle of tort
law in the United States at the time that ATS was
adopted.255
In his dissent, Judge Kavanaugh first opined that (1)
ATS does not apply extraterritorily to violations that
occurred in different nations; (2) the Second Circuit was
correct in analyzing corporate liability under CIL, and no
international tribunal had ever allowed a CIL claim against
a corporation; (3) even if CIL provides for corporate liability
under ATS, the application of ATS would be incongruent
with the TVPA; and (4) plaintiff’s complaint should be
dismissed based on the Executive Branch’s opinion that the
suit would hinder foreign policy goals.256
Relying on the TVPA as evidence of congressional
intent, the Exxon dissent noted that corporate liability
under ATS was at odds with the congressional intent of the
TVPA. Inasmuch as Congress specifically limited corporate
liability under the TVPA by only authorizing recovery from
individuals who engage in torture or extrajudicial killing
“under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any
foreign nation,”257 Judge Kavanaugh said that ATS should,
252. Id.
253. Id. at 45.
254. Id. at 47.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 72-74 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
257. 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992).
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likewise, provide neither corporate nor aiding and abetting
liability.258 Borrowing from Sosa, the dissent noted that it
must look for “‘legislative guidance before exercising
innovative authority over substantive law’ in ATS cases,”259
and argued that the majority should look to the TVPA
“when fashioning the contours of the famously vague
ATS.”260 If U.S. citizens are unable to recover against
corporations for torture and extrajudicial killing, it would be
“odd and incongruous to disregard those limits in defining
when aliens may sue” for the same conduct.261 Thus, the
majority’s failure to consider the scope of the TVPA,
reasoned Judge Kavanaugh, “produce[d] the rather bizarre
outcome that aliens may sue corporations in U.S. courts for
aiding and abetting torture and extrajudicial killing, but
U.S. citizens may not sue U.S. corporations” for the same.262
The majority conceded that the House Foreign Affairs
Committee amended the TVPA to impose liability on “an
individual,” instead of on “any person” as appeared in the
initial draft of the bill.263 Further, the majority noted that
one congressional committee member had noted that the
purpose of the amendment was to “make clear that the bill
applie[d] to ‘individuals and not to corporations.’”264
Nonetheless, said the dissent, the Committee’s actions in
amending the TVPA a statute intended to supplement the
ATS did not speak to the issue of corporate liability under
ATS265 a statute “designed to afford greater jurisdictional
protections to aliens.”266

258. Exxon, 654 F.3d at 72, 85-88 (Kavanaugh J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 86 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004)).
260. Id. at 87.
261. Id. at 87.
262. Id. at 88.
263. Id. at 56 (majority opinion) (citing The Torture Victims Protection Act:
Hearing and Markup Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 1417,
100th Cong. 87-88 (1988)).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 85-87 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
266. Id. at 56 (majority opinion).
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C. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.
In a more concise, twelve-page opinion, decided just
three days after Exxon on July 11, 2011, the Seventh Circuit
rejected Kiobel and held that a corporation or any other
non-natural person (in this case a limited liability company)
could be held liable under ATS.267 In Flomo, the plaintiffs
sued the Firestone Natural Rubber Company, challenging
its Liberian subsidiary’s practice of allegedly utilizing
hazardous child labor.268 While the subsidiary did not
directly employ children, “it set[ ] high daily production
quotas” that were difficult for its employees to meet without
help.269 In order to meet this quota, the workers would often
“dragoon their wives or children into helping them, at no
monetary cost.”270
The opinion, written by Judge Posner, began by
discussing the difficulty of defining CIL norms, which have
a “soft, indeterminate character,”271 and noted that the
future of corporate liability was left open in an “enigmatic
footnote in Sosa.”272 Once again, addressing the muchcontested I.G. Farben case, the court attacked “[t]he factual
premise” of Kiobel, and noted that German corporations
that assisted the Nazi war effort were dissolved by the
Allied Powers under the authority of CIL, including I.G.
Farben, whose assets were seized and made available for
reparations.273 The court acknowledged that corporations
have rarely been prosecuted either criminally or civilly for
violating CIL norms, but reasoned that this fact alone did
not reflect “a desire to keep liability . . . within tight bounds
by confining it to abhorrent conduct the kind of conduct
267. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1013 (7th Cir.
2011).
268. Id. at 1015.
269. Id. at 1023.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1015 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247-48
(2d Cir. 2003)).
272. Id. at 1017.
273. Id.
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that invites criminal sanctions.”274 It would have “seemed
tepid,” said the court, to sue the Nazi war criminals in tort
with such charges as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful death, and battery, and thus, it was
natural that a tradition would develop of punishing
violations of CIL criminally.275 Based on this rationale, the
court reasoned that it was not significant that corporations
“ha[d]n’t [previously] figured in prosecutions of war
criminals and other violators of [CIL].”276 Even if, the court
reasoned, a corporation had never been punished for
violating a CIL norm, there must “always [be] a first time
for litigation to enforce a norm.”277 The court went on to
point out:
If a corporation complicit in Nazi war crimes could be punished
criminally for violating [CIL], as we believe it could be, then a
fortiori if the board of directors of a corporation directs the
corporation’s managers to commit war crimes, engage in piracy,
abuse ambassadors, or use slave labor, the corporation can be
278
civilly liable.

At the heart of the Flomo court’s argument was that
Kiobel mistook Sosa’s mandate as a means of defining the
procedural scope of ATS, instead of the means of defining
the substantive scope of actionable CIL norms that it was
intended to be. The court reasoned that “[i]f a plaintiff had
to show that civil liability for such violations was itself a
norm, . . . no claim under [ATS] could ever be successful”
(because the United States is the only country that imposes
civil liability).279 It further reasoned that even if “the only
actionable violations” of CIL were “acts so maleficent that
criminal punishment would be an appropriate sanction for
the actors,” it would still be proper to punish the actors with

274. Id. at 1018.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 1019.
277. Id. at 1017.
278. Id. at 1019 (second emphasis added) (citing Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 170 (2010) (Leval, J., concurring)).
279. Id. (emphasis added).
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civil sanctions for the same violations.280 Citing a number of
treaties that allow a country to elect alternative remedies to
criminal liability, the court found that “[i]nternational law
imposes substantive obligations and the individual nations
decide how to enforce them.”281 Finally, the court noted that
imposing liability on an entity that “does not breathe” is
well-grounded in the precedent of parties obtaining in rem
judgments against pirate ships.282 While the court “satisfied
[itself] that corporate liability is possible” under ATS, the
court ultimately concluded that there was not an “adequate
basis” to infer that the alleged child labor at the Firestone
plantation violated a CIL norm.283
D. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC
On October 25, 2011, the Ninth Circuit, in a lengthy en
banc decision,284 decided a number of ATS issues holding,
inter alia, that (1) ATS liability may be applied
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1020.
282. Id. at 1021 (citation omitted).
283. Id. at 1021, 1024.
284. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 2011 WL 5041927, at *1 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2011). The case has a rather complex procedural history. The Ninth
Circuit’s most recent decision was the second time the case was heard by the en
banc court. Id. In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 825 (9th Cir. 2008), the
court was divided on the issue of exhaustion of local remedies. On remand, the
court gave plaintiffs the choice to either withdraw or to submit their claims to
the two-step exhaustion process. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004,
1032 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The plaintiffs withdrew a number of claims, and the only
claims that remained for consideration in the subsequent (and final) appeal
were plaintiffs’ claims for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
racial discrimination. Rio Tinto, 2011 WL 5041927, at *1. Seven separate
opinions were filed: (1) Judge Schroeder filed the en banc decision; (2) Judge
Reinhardt filed a concurring opinion; (3) Judge Pregerson filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Judge Rawlinson joined, (4)
Judge McKeown filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in
which Judges Reinhardt and Berson joined; (5) Judge Bea filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Judges Kleinfeld and
Callahan joined and in which Judge Ikuta joined in part; (6) Judge Kleinfeld
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Bea and Ikuta joined; and, (7) Judge
Ikuta filed a dissenting opinion in which Judges Kleinfeld, Callahan, and Bea
joined. Id.
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extraterritorially,285 (2) corporations may be found liable
under ATS,286 (3) ATS does not bar “aiding and abetting
liability,”287 (4) there is “arising under” jurisdiction and
courts may develop federal common law in such cases,288 and
(5) prudential exhaustion may be required in ATS cases.289
In Rio Tinto, plaintiffs, current and former residents of the
island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (“PNG”),
brought suit against defendants Rio Tinto PLC and Rio
Tinto Limited, a mining company.290 Rio Tinto’s operations
caused vast environmental damage, which led to an
uprising against it in the late 1980s that resulted in the use
of military force against citizens of PNG and many deaths.291
The majority, in an opinion written by Judge Schroeder,
found that ATS, itself, is not a bar to corporate liability.292
Like the Exxon dissent, the majority relied on the TVPA for
support, concluding that while Congress explicitly rejected
corporate liability under the TVPA, no such prohibition
exists under ATS.293 The majority’s interpretation of Sosa,
however, differs radically from that of the D.C. and Seventh
Circuit.294 Under Sosa, the majority reasoned, the scope of
285. Id. at *4-5.
286. Id. at *6.
287. Id. at *7. Judge Pregerson dissented in part with the majority’s mens rea
standard for aiding and abetting liability, opining that “knowledge that one is
assisting unlawful activity is the applicable mens rea standard for aiding and
abetting liability.” Id. at *31 (Pregerson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
288. Id. at *13 (majority opinion).
289. Id. at *14.
290. See id. at *1.
291. Id.
292. Id. at *6.
293. Id. (citing Bowoto v. Chevron, 621 F.3d 1116, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2010)).
294. Id. at *20. While the Exxon and Flomo courts both argued that the Kiobel
majority misunderstood Sosa, and that corporate liability itself need not be a
“specific, universal, and obligatory” norm under substantive law, they found
that the determination of whether to impose liability was a matter of procedure
to be derived from the federal common law. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,
654 F.3d 11, 43-53 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643
F.3d 1013, 1017-20 (7th Cir. 2011).
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liability of private actors is specific to each cause of action
asserted, i.e., to each alleged violation of a CIL norm.295 “The
proper inquiry, therefore, should consider separately each
violation of international law alleged and which actors may
violate it.”296 The main question for the court in determining
liability, then, was not whether there was an overall
precedent for imposing liability on a particular actor, but
whether “international law extends its prohibitions to the
perpetrators in question.”297 Recognizing that its opinion
was in conflict with Kiobel, the court explained that given
the fact that Congress could have never imagined the
number of international institutions that exist today, and
thus liability was not limited to “where international fora”
had imposed it.298
Using this analysis, the majority first considered
corporate liability for acts of genocide. The court looked to
the Genocide Convention as evidence that the prohibition
against genocide was a jus cogens norm, cognizable under
ATS.299 Further, under Article IX of the Genocide
Convention, parties may submit disputes to the ICJ
“relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide.”300 The
court determined that the International Court of Justice
recognized a universal prohibition of genocide such that the
commission of genocide violates international law whether
committed by a state, an individual, or an “amorphous
group.”301 Based on this universal prohibition, the court
reasoned, liability for genocide extends to corporations.
Next, the court found that the prohibition against war
crimes as defined in Common Article III of the Geneva

295. Rio Tinto, 2011 WL 5041927, at *7.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *20.
298. Id.
299. Id. at *18-19.
300. Id. at *19 (quoting Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide art IX, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951)).
301. Id.
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Convention302 was a specific, universal, obligatory norm.303
Relying on two district court cases304 and the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision in Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co.,305 the
court determined that international law also extends the
scope of liability to war crimes.306 The court further
determined that the alleged food and medical blockade did
not constitute a crime against humanity because
international law did not recognize such a blockade to be in
violation of an internationally recognized norm.307 The court
noted that neither the ICTY nor ICTR referred to a
deprivation of food and medicine, and that the Rome
Statute included the deprivation of food and medicine but
did not specifically mention a blockade.308 In rejecting
plaintiffs’ racial discrimination claim, the court found that
the Racial Discrimination Convention did not include a
provision for “systemic” racial discrimination, and that the
treaty itself had not been sufficiently enforced by the
international community.309
302. Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War art. 3, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
303. Rio Tinto, 2011 WL 5041927, at *23-24.
304. Al Qurasishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 744 (D. Md. 2010) (“The
Fourth Geneva Convention does not limit its application based on the identity of
the perpetrator of the war crimes. Rather its protections arise based on who the
potential victims are.”); In re Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 582
(E.D. Va. 2009) (“Claims for violators of the international norm proscribing war
crimes are cognizable under the ATS.”).
305. 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that liability under the ATS
has expanded to include corporations).
306. Rio Tinto, 2011 WL 5041927, at *24-25. Additionally, the court found that
“at least purposive action in furtherance of a war crime constitutes aiding and
abetting that crime.” Id. at *25.
307. Id. at *27-28.
308. Id. at *27 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 161, art. 7(2)(b)). Judge
Pregerson dissented finding that the food and medical blockade constituted
murder and torture, and was therefore a crime against humanity. See id. at
*34-36 (Pregerson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
309. Id. at *28 (majority opinion) (citing International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969)). Judge Pregerson
disagreed with the majority, finding that there was a jus cogens norm
prohibiting systematic racial discrimination, and that the plaintiffs had
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In affirming the majority’s decision to impose ATS
liability on corporations, Judge McKeown agreed that a
norm-specific inquiry was the proper analysis but “rejected
the notion that we must find an example of corporate
liability in an international forum.”310 He noted that
international criminal tribunals could “not be invoked as
limiting factors regarding the capacity of defendants,” as
they impose criminal rather than civil liability.311 He further
opined that inasmuch as the two international prohibitions
against genocide and war crimes are restricted in scope by
the identity of the victim and not the actor, ATS liability for
such violations extends to corporate actors.312
1. Exhaustion of Remedies. The Ninth Circuit is unique
in reading an exhaustion requirement into ATS a
requirement that was not addressed by Sosa or Kiobel. In
the Rio Tinto plurality’s initial remand order, the plurality
set forth a two-factor balancing test requiring the district
court to weigh the following factors:
(1) [T]he strength of the nexus, if any between the United States
and the acts and omissions alleged in the complaint—the less
nexus, the more reason for exhaustion, and (2) the gravity of the
violations alleged, namely whether the claims implicated ‘matters
of universal concern’—the more grave the violations, the less
313
reason for exhaustion.

If these factors weighed in favor of imposing an
exhaustion requirement, the plurality opinion set out a twopart exhaustion test: “(1) [W]hether the foreign plaintiffs
had local remedies where the alleged torts occurred and had
exhausted them, and if not, (2) whether any exhaustion
requirement is excused because local remedies are

adequately alleged that it took place under the color of law, as required. Id. at
*36-37 (Pregerson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
310. Id. at *45 (McKeown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
311. Id.
312. Id. at *44. Judge McKeown found, however, that plaintiffs had not
sufficiently stated claims for genocide and war crimes. Id. at *46-47.
313. Id. at *49 (Bea, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citing Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008)).
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ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or
otherwise futile to pursue.”314
Judge Bea, joined by Kleinfeld and Callahan, concurred
in part and dissented in part on the basis that the district
court erred in applying the rules of “prudential exhaustion”
and that the plaintiff was barred by the mandatory
exhaustion provisions of the law of nations, which in his
view required an exhaustion of local remedies.315 Under the
first prong of the plurality’s test, Judge Bea noted that the
district court erred in finding a nexus, and that the only
connection between the cause of action and the United
States was that Rio Tinto did business in the United
States.316 Finding that the district court failed to properly
implement the balancing test, Judge Bea was of the opinion
that the case should be remanded.317 The majority, however,
found that the district court had not abused its discretion in
this regard.318 The majority opined that the universality of
the norm alleged to be violated is a factor in determining
whether exhaustion is required, and that even if a claim has
a weak nexus to the United States, it may be allowed to
proceed without the exhaustion of local remedies.319
Likewise, the Flomo court rejected a similar argument that
plaintiffs in ATS suits were required to exhaust all legal
remedies in the nation in which the violation occurred, but
conceded that for the purpose of international comity, a
federal court might stay an ATS suit “in order to give the
courts of the nation in which the violation occurred a chance
to remedy it.”320
2. Extraterritoriality and Universal Jurisdiction. Judge
Kleinfeld’s Rio Tinto dissent took an even stronger position
against ATS, suggesting that there is no Article III
314. Id. at *50.
315. Id. at *51-52.
316. Id.
317. Id. at *53.
318. Id. at *14 (majority opinion).
319. Id.
320. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir.
2011).
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jurisdiction over claims between two aliens.321 Instead, ATS
was “promulgated to enable foreigners to sue for violations
in America of a narrow set of norms, where failure to
vindicate the wrongs might embroil our weak, new nation in
diplomatic or military disputes.”322 Noting that a respect for
state sovereignty was at the heart of ATS, Kleinfeld
reasoned that recent European attempts to assert universal
jurisdiction over unpopular foreign officials accused of
committing atrocities, including Spain’s failed attempts to
prosecute U.S. executives for alleged war crimes in
Guantanamo and Iraq, did not establish an international
consensus for universal jurisdiction—particularly in civil
cases.323 Further, the dissent noted that there was a lack of
clearly expressed affirmative congressional intent that ATS
was meant to apply extraterritorially.324 Relying on the
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.325 “bright line
rule” and the Charming Betsy canon of construction,326 the
dissent noted that ambiguous statutes should be read as to
“avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign
authority of other nations.”327 ATS, reasoned Kleinfeld, only
indicated what may constitute a tort but did not indicate
where the tort was committed, and in the absence of clearly
expressed congressional intent, foreign courts were not to
“wield their swords in foreign countries for wrongs having
nothing to do with their own country.”328
Using a slippery slope argument, Judge Kleinfeld
argued that the courts’ exercise of ATS jurisdiction could
open the door to suits against U.S. officials in foreign courts:
“Once we release the genie of universal jurisdiction from the
321. Rio Tinto, 2011 WL 5041927, at *54 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
322. Id.
323. Id. at *58.
324. Id. at *60-62.
325. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
326. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“It
has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”).
327. Rio Tinto, 2011 WL 5041927, at *61 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at *62.
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bottle, we cannot control for whom the genie works its
magic.”329 Calling the majority’s exercise of ATS jurisdiction
over the alleged violations that occurred in PNG a small
county of which the United States has no nexus “judicial
imperialism,” Judge Kleinfeld opined that ATS did not
grant jurisdiction over claims committed “by foreign
nationals in foreign countries against foreign nationals.”330
Similarly, in Exxon, Judge Kavanaugh also stated that
the long-recognized presumption against extraterritoriality
applied to ATS inasmuch as ATS gives no express indication
that it applies outside the United States.331 While the
historical record provides evidence that the First Congress
wanted to have jurisdiction over claims in which aliens were
injured in the United States, Judge Kavanaugh believed
that it provided no evidence that Congress was “concerned
about remedying aliens injured in foreign lands.”332 Since
the purpose of ATS was to avoid foreign conflicts, it would
be “very odd to think that Congress of 1789 wanted to create
a French tort cause of action enforceable in U.S. court for,
say, a Frenchman injured in London.”333
Beyond the fact that ATS was not meant to apply
extraterritorially, Judge Kavanaugh reasoned that
“something is palpably awry in the modern ATS litigation
juggernaut”334 as ATS cases actually “engendered conflict
with other sovereign nations.”335 The dissent noted the
Indonesian government’s objection to the Exxon suit, the
South African government’s objection to post-Apartheid
ATS litigation, and PNG’s objection to the Rio Tinto suit.336
In his opinion, however, applying ATS on the high seas did
329. Id. at *66.
330. Id. at *67-68.
331. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 645 F.3d 11, 75-76 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
332. Id. at 77.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 78.
335. Id. at 77.
336. Id. at 77-78.
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not pose the risk of conflict, as confirmed by earlier cases
that applied ATS to this type of conduct.337
The Rio Tinto majority “categorically rejected the
argument that ATS applies only to torts committed in this
country,”338 noting that the issue had been previously
addressed in In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human
Rights Litigation and that ATS “shows on its face: no
limitations on citizenship of the defendant, or the locus of
the injury.”339 The majority found the dissenting judge’s
reliance on Morrison misplaced as that case ruled that
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not
apply to securities transactions conducted in other nations,
and did not address ATS claims.340 Judge McKeown agreed
that claims under the law of nations encompass
extraterritorial conduct.341 Analogizing ATS jurisdiction to
federal question jurisdiction, McKeown’s concurrence noted
that the proper inquiry is not whether the statute itself
extends extraterritorially, but whether the cause of action
does.342 ATS, reasoned Judge McKeown, “cabins the source
of the cause of action by reference to ‘the law of nations,’”343
and given this international focus, it is clear that Congress
intended the statute to apply both to conduct occurring in
and out of the United States.344 The Flomo court also
rejected defendant’s argument that ATS has no
extraterritorial application, reasoning that the Sosa case
centered on “nonmaritime, extraterritorial conduct,” and

337. Id. at 78.
338. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 2011 WL 5041927, at *3 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2011).
339. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 499-501 (9th Cir. 1992) (considering an ATS case based
on torture that took place in the Philippines, and finding that ATS could be used
extraterritorially)).
340. Id. at *4.
341. Id. at *38 (McKeown, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
342. Id.
343. Id. at *38.
344. Id. at *39.
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that if the statute was not meant to apply extraterritorially,
it would be “superfluous.”345
3. “Arising Under” Jurisdiction. Similar to the
argument that ATS does not apply extraterritorially, Judge
Ikuta’s Rio Tinto dissent opined that federal courts only
have jurisdiction over suits between an alien and a
citizen.346 Article III judges, Judge Ikuta said, only have
jurisdiction over (1) cases “arising under” the “laws of the
United States”; (2) cases relating to a specific subject
matter; and (3) cases relating to specific parties, such as
those affecting ambassadors.347 According to Judge Ikuta,
because international law is not part of the “Laws of the
United States,” and ATS is a “purely jurisdictional” statute
that does not create a body of substantive law, a claim
arising between two foreigners did not fit into any of three
jurisdictional categories.348 Judge Ikuta opined that Sosa’s
silence on the jurisdictional issue could not be read as an
endorsement; rather, the Court in Sosa had no reason to
address the Article III issue because the tort claims in that
case “shared a common nucleus of operative fact with
plaintiff’s original and jurisdictionally unproblematic
claims.”349 Judge Ikuta contended that inasmuch as ATS did
not create substantive federal law and that the historical
evidence suggested that Congress purposefully omitted “the
law of nations” from the scope of Article III power, ATS was
only intended to allow the courts to hear claims brought by
aliens against citizens.350 The majority dismissed Judge
Ikuta’s contention, noting that the “common law” had
changed dramatically after Erie,351 and that ATS cases

345. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir.
2011).
346. Rio Tinto, 2011 WL 5041927, at *68 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at *69.
348. Id. at *69-70.
349. Id. at *69, *79-80.
350. Id. at *69.
351. Id. at *8-9 (majority opinion) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938)).
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“arise under” the “laws of the United States.”352 The court
“read Sosa to permit courts to develop federal common law
by incorporating into it certain claims that derive from
norms of international law—but only after determining that
they meet the Sosa standards.”353
V. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF ATS: THE JUSTICES
WEIGH IN
While the issue of extraterritoriality was not addressed
in Kiobel, the Supreme Court, prompted by Judge
Kavanaugh and Judge Kleinfeld’s opinions, focused heavily
on the issue at the February 28, 2012 oral arguments.354
Justice Kennedy immediately set the tone for the argument,
asking attorney for the Petitioners, Paul Hoffman, if
Petitioners could refute the proposition raised in an amicus
brief that: “No other nation in the world permits its court to
exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged
extraterritorial human rights abuses to which the nation
has no connection.”355 Justice Alito asked if a similar case
could be brought in “[a]ny other country other than the
country of the citizenship of the defendants.”356 Chief Justice
Roberts went further, asking, “if there is no other country
where this suit could have been brought, regardless of what
American domestic law provides, isn’t it a legitimate
concern that allowing the suit itself contravenes
international law?”357
Justice Alito, noting that the case involves twelve
Nigerian plaintiffs alleging violations committed against
them by a foreign dictatorship in Nigeria, asked: “What . . .
business does a case like that have in the courts of the
352. Id. at *13.
353. Id. at *10.
354. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9.
355. Id. at 3-4 (quoting Brief of Chevron Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491
(U.S. Feb. 3, 2012)).
356. Id. at 7.
357. Id. at 8.
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United States?”358 Drilling into the extraterritoriality
problem, Justice Alito asked: “Do you really that think the
first Congress wanted victims of the French Revolution to
be able . . . to sue French defendants in the courts of the
United States?”359
Referencing the legislative intent of “preventing
international tension,”360 Alito noted that the case had “no
connection to the United States whatsoever” and that “this
kind of a lawsuit only creates international tension.”361
Justice Kennedy distinguished Filartiga from Kiobel noting
that the Filartiga victims and the defendant had a
residence in New York, while “[i]n this case, the
corporations have residences and presence in many other
countries where they have . . . many more contacts than
here.”362 Finally, Justice Breyer, in questioning Deputy
Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler, arguing on behalf of
the United States as amicus curiae, pointed out that there
is no “United States Supreme Court of the World.”363
After hearing arguments, the Court ordered that the
case be rebriefed and reargued to encompass the broader
extraterritoriality issue.364 It is likely that this issue will be
pivotal to the Court’s ultimate decision.
VI. RECONCILING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
It is difficult to reconcile the circuit split, as there is
internal discord within the Kiobel, Exxon, and Rio Tinto
panels. The Eleventh Circuit seems to have arrived at its
conclusion simply on the basis that it could not find any

358. Id. at 11.
359. Id. at 12.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 13-14.
363. Id. at 23.
364. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012)
(memorandum restoring case to calendar for reargument).
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express prohibition against corporate liability.365 Since the
Romero decision, however, the other circuits have found
support for corporate liability within both international law
and the statute’s historical record.366 There appears to be an
ideological split over whether the imposition of liability is a
matter of substantive law, as the Kiobel majority and Ninth
Circuit have found, or procedural law and remedy, as
argued by the Seventh and D.C. Circuits. At oral argument,
reflecting the latter interpretation, Justice Kagan stated:
“[T]he question then is, can one hold the corporation
responsible for that tort? And that seems to be a question of
enforcement, of remedy; not of substantive international
law.”367 Justice Kennedy asked if Respondent was
“conced[ing] away too much” by “say[ing] well there’s a
difference in substance . . . and remedy questions of jury
trial, damages, and so forth. That’s domestic.”368 Kathleen
M. Sullivan, counsel for the Respondent, argued that the
second step in Sosa provided a “second screen” and that:
[E]ven if international law had provided any source of corporate
liability, which it does not, you would still have to ask—footnote
30 of Sosa says it's a higher bar—should Federal common law . . .
now embrace these kinds of actions? And the answer is “no.” Even
if you found this were a question of domestic remedy, we think
you cannot. This is a question of substance. But even if this were a
question of—domestic remedy, you should not find liability for
369
corporations . . . .

As noted by the Seventh Circuit in Flomo, if anything,
the Circuit’s differing interpretation of Sosa’s mandate
highlights the “conspicuous” problems inherent in ATS:
First, there is a problem of notice: a custom cannot be identified
with the same confidence as a provision in a legally authoritative
text, such as a statute or a treaty. (Modern common law doesn’t
present that problem; it is a body of judge-created doctrine, not of
365. See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that ATS does not provide an exception for corporations).
366. See supra Part IV.
367. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 30.
368. Id. at 41.
369. Id. at 42.
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amorphous custom.) Second, there is a problem of legitimacy—and
for democratic countries it is a problem of democratic legitimacy.
Customary international legal duties are imposed by the
international community (ideally, though rarely—given the
diversity of the world’s 194 nations—by consensus), rather than
370
by laws promulgated by the obligee’s local community.

The Supreme Court must determine which court
correctly applied the Sosa guidelines to their analysis, and
whether Sosa actually requires that corporate liability itself
be a well-established norm in the law of nations.
The recent caselaw suggests a level of judicial activism
that Professor Julian Ku argues leaves the courts to resort
to gap-filling:
Harmless but seemingly useful gap-filling has and will tempt U.S.
courts as they further develop the standards of private corporation
liability
under
customary
international
law.
Judicial
pronouncements on veil-piercing for foreign corporations and their
subsidiaries, enterprise liability, and standards for determining
371
corporate intent will all be justified and explained as gap filling.

This practice of judicial development and recognition of
new standards of international law is inconsistent with
Sosa’s instructions to exercise caution in developing new
causes of action. As John B. Bellinger III, former legal
advisor to the State Department argues: “[T]he development
of the scope of the ATS has largely been left to litigants and
the courts, without formal involvement from Congress and
largely contrary to the views of the Executive.”372 To be
clear, Kiobel in no way alleviates corporations of their social
and moral responsibilities, nor does it advocate that
corporations should commit, aid, or turn a blind eye to the
commission of flagrant human rights violations. However, it
is reasonable for Congress to clarify the scope of ATS,
instead of requiring that the judiciary rely on gap-filling.
370. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir.
2011).
371. Ku, supra note 13, at 391-92.
372. John B. Bellinger III, Lecture, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts
and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 2 (2009).
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Congress should define the scope of ATS liability and the
causes of action encompassed under the law of nations.
A. Should Corporations Face Tort Liability for Human
Rights Violations? The Debate
The debate over corporate liability under ATS rages on
in corporate boardrooms, academic circles, NGOs, and the
courts. These arguments, while some are novel, have been
repeated again and again since Filartiga. Proponents of
corporate liability argue that it is inherently unfair to
recognize corporations as having rights, but at the same
time, seek to immunize them from liability for failing to
exercise their duties.373 Human rights groups hope that this
impact litigation will attempt to foster corporate
accountability and raise public awareness of violations
taking place against corporate employees and third world
citizens.374 Critics argue that the pursuit of an ATS verdict
is a fruitless act—cases have rarely proven successful and
judgments are often difficult to collect.375 Alternatively,
human rights activists argue that corporations have the
deep-pockets needed to compensate victims, and that ATS
provides one of the only forums where victims can seek
retribution.376 The debate encompasses policy and fiscal
concerns, as much as it includes debates over the true scope
of the statute.
One common argument against the imposition of
corporate liability is that it would prevent corporations from
expanding their businesses into regions with substandard
373. See Harold Hongju Koh, Separating Myth From Reality About Corporate
Responsibility Litigation, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 263, 265 (2004); see also Flomo, 643
F.3d at 1020 (“American corporations that have branches in backward or
disordered countries may be incapable of preventing abuses of workers in those
countries by their employees.”).
374. See Paul Magnusson, Legal Settlements: A Milestone for Human Rights,
BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 63, 63.
375. See, e.g., Philip A. Scarborough, Note, Rules of Decision for Issues Arising
Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 n.16 (2007).
376. See id. (“[C]orporations are attractive ATS defendants because there is a
real possibility of financial recovery on any judgment (or settlement) that might
be obtained.”).

2012]

PIRATES, INCORPORATED?

881

human rights practices—regions where resources are
abundant, and the economic climate is favorable to profitmaximizing—because companies operating in these
locations would fear being subject to liability for the
activities it cannot directly control.377 Judge Leval criticized
this argument that, stating: “The shoemaker of Hitler’s
shoes should not be held responsible for Hitler’s atrocities,
even if the shoemaker knows that a pair of shoes will help
Hitler accomplish his horrendous agenda.”378 Judge Posner,
rather bitingly, addressed the same argument:
One of the amicus curiae briefs argues seemingly not tongue in
cheek, that corporations shouldn’t be liable under [ATS] because
that would be bad for business. That may seem both irrelevant
and obvious; it is irrelevant, but not obvious. Businesses in
countries that have and enforce laws against child labor are hurt
by competition from businesses that employ child labor in
379
countries in which employing children is condoned.

At the Kiobel oral argument, Justice Breyer posed a
similar hypothetical to Respondent:
Do you think in the 18th century if they'd brought Pirates,
Incorporated, and we get all their gold, and Blackbeard gets up
and he says, “Oh, it isn't me; it's the corporation!” Do you think
that they would have then said, “Oh, I see, it's a corporation.
380
Goodbye. Go home.”

Referencing Talisman’s heightened mens rea standard
requiring corporations to act with the purpose of promoting
another violator’s activities in order to be liable, the Kiobel
concurrence sought to prove that the chain of liability would
not be so attenuated as to cause undue hardship on
377. See, e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, INST. FOR
INT’L ECONS., AWAKENING MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 40
(2003). But see Koh, supra note 373, at 269(“[P]laintiff[s] need[ ] to show much,
much more than simply that the multinational enterprise has chosen to invest
in a ‘troublesome country.’”).
378. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 611 F.3d 111, 158 (2d Cir. 2010)
(Leval, J., concurring).
379. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir.
2011).
380. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 25-26. Ms. Sullivan
responded: “[Y]es, the corporation would not be liable.” Id. at 26.
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corporations.381 The Flomo court, similarly, criticized that
this argument was not an “objection to corporate civil
liability,” but rather to its scope.382 In declining to define
how far corporate vicarious liability extends under ATS,
Judge Posner noted that the plaintiffs conceded that
liability extends only to “violations that are directed,
encouraged, or condoned at the corporate defendant’s
decision-making level.”383 Critics worry that the corporation
as a whole may be hauled into court when these
subsidiaries commit human rights violations, even if the
parent corporation had no knowledge and did not consent to
such violations.384 While pro-business groups have
contended that Kiobel will discourage investment in foreign
markets,385 human rights activists have criticized the
Second Circuit for creating “perverse incentives for actors in
conflict zones to collude with one another at the expense of
human rights protections for civilians and communities.”386
Another major concern by pro-business groups and the
executive branch is the effect ATS litigation has on foreign
381. See Kiobel, 611 F.3d at 154, 157-58 (Leval, J., concurring).
382. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1021.
383. Id.
384. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, A Modest Proposal to Amend the Alien Tort
Statute to Provide Guidance to Transnational Corporations, 13 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 119, 132-33 (2007).
385. Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Sarei v.
Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 02–56256, 02–56390, 09–
56381), 2009 WL 8174962, at *1 (arguing that corporate ATS litigation
“threatens to deter cross-border business activity that is beneficial both to
Americans and to the citizens of other nations”); Brief of Amicus Curiae the
Federation of German Industries in Support of Defendants-Appellees/CrossAppellants Seeking Reversal of District Court Decision at 2, Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 73 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, 09-56381), 2009 WL
5538942 (“Because the willingness of companies to invest abroad hinges
critically on identifying, measuring, and limiting risk, German industry has a
substantial interest in ensuring that U.S. federal courts respect a foreign
nation’s ability to regulate its own affairs. German companies have long
operated pursuant to self-imposed good-governance guidelines and consistent
with all domestic and international legal requirements governing their foreign
investment and related business operations.”).
386. Giannini & Farbstein, supra note 182, at 132.
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affairs.387 The Bush administration submitted amicus briefs,
statements of interest, and letters in a number of ATS cases
involving corporate liability that proved to be influential in
having these cases dismissed.388 In Judge Kavanaugh’s
Exxon dissent, he noted that the Department of State
opposed the litigation, stating that it would hinder antiterrorism efforts and the promotion of human rights in
Indonesia, and could affect the Indonesian economy at the
detriment of U.S. interests.389 The majority noted that the
Government did not request dismissal of the case and that
the district court had granted substantial weight to U.S.
concerns such that the adjudication of the case would not
impede foreign relations.390 The Rio Tinto court dismissed
defendants’ argument that the case was barred by the
political question doctrine, noting that the Department of
State no longer believed that the litigation would adversely
impact reconciliation in the war between PNG and
Bougainville.391 Further, the majority found that the court’s
consideration of the exhaustion requirements alleviated any
concerns that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the political
comity doctrine: “It is out of that very spirit of cooperation
387. This argument was echoed in footnote twenty-one of Sosa and in Judge
Bork’s Tel-Oren concurrence. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733
n.21 (2004); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 744, 801-02 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
388. See Bellinger, supra note 372, at 12; see also DAVIS, supra note 13, at 140
(“Another factor driving the Bush Administration’s stringent opposition in ATS
cases is its fear that administration officials may be sued in U.S. courts or in the
courts of other nations.”); c.f. Beth Stephens, Judicial Deference and the
Unreasonable Views of the Bush Administration, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 773, 809
(2008) (“In a remarkable break from recent history, the courts have rejected a
significant number of Bush administration suggestions that corporatedefendant ATS cases endanger U.S. foreign policy. A close look at those cases
makes clear that the shift is not the result of a change in the way the courts
have exercised their authority, but rather a judicious recognition that the Bush
administration views are unreasonable, and therefore undeserving of
deference.”).
389. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
390. See id. at 61, 64 (majority opinion).
391. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 2011 WL 5041927, at *14 (9th
Cir. Oct. 25, 2011).
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and deference to tribunals in other nations [i.e. comity] that
we held exhaustion may be a prudential bar to certain” ATS
claims.392
The Obama administration, on the other hand, has
come out in support of corporate liability under ATS. In its
amicus brief, the Government noted it was “not aware of
any international-law norm of the sort identified in Sosa
that distinguishes between natural and juridical persons.”393
Further, it took a similar approach as Flomo and Exxon
arguing that corporate liability under ATS “should be
determined as a matter of federal common law.”394
Additionally, like the Rio Tinto court, the Government
argued that the court must conduct a “norm-by-norm
assessment to determine whether the actor being sued is
within the scope of the identified norm.”395 Further, the
Government contended that neither the text and history of
ATS nor the “legal culture” of the United States provided a
basis for rejecting corporate personhood under ATS.396
Human rights activists caution that the courts’ (and the
former Bush administration’s) opposition to corporate
liability perpetuates the stereotype that the United States
holds the world to a higher standard than itself, and that it
“is unwilling to sacrifice the narrow economic interests of a
few U.S. multinationals in order to protect human rights by
placing even modest limits on their actions abroad.”397 The
392. Id. at *16.
393. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7,
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Dec. 21, 2011), 2011 WL
6425363, at *7.
394. Id. at 15.
395. Id. at 18.
396. Id. at 7.
397. Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effect of Tort: How Corporate
Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive
Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 230 (2008); see Brief of Amici Curiae
U.S. Diplomats in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 23, Sarei v. Rio Tinto,
PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 02-56256, 02-56390, 09-56381), 2010
WL 5780095, at *23 (“When U.S. companies operate overseas, their actions
reflect upon the United States as a whole. Our standing as a world leader and
our commitment to human rights are diminished if we fail to hold accountable
those who are complicit in human rights violations.”).
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United States has not ratified an international human
rights treaty since its December 2002 ratification of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child’s two optional
protocols.398 However, as Judge Jacobs stated, there is no
“consensus among nations that American courts and
lawyers have the power to bring to court transnational
corporations of other countries, to inquire into their
operations in third countries, to regulate them—and to
beggar them by rendering theirs assets into compensatory
damages, punitive damages, and (American) legal fees.”399
Thus, it is also said that the concept of ATS, itself, makes
the United States, with its far from perfect human rights
record, a hypocrite, in that its courts judge the actions of
noncitizens, and the human rights records of other
countries.400
B. Courts Should Continue to Construe ATS Narrowly
Until Congress Speaks to the Issue
Despite its “posted . . . warning signs against judicial
innovation,”401 Sosa gave the courts an unusually broad
mandate to interpret international law402 and unilaterally
define the scope of ATS. Since the scope of ATS has
expanded exponentially from its application to the
eighteenth-century paradigms and since members of the
398. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNITED STATES RATIFICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES 1 (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/24/unitedstates-ratification-international-human-rights-treaties.
399. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 2011).
400. Bellinger, supra note 372, at 2 (“ATS has given rise to friction, sometimes
considerable, in our relations with foreign governments, who understandably
object to their officials or their domestic corporations being subjected to U.S.
jurisdiction for activities taking place in foreign countries and having nothing to
do with the United States.”).
401. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810, 814 (S.D.
Ind. 2010).
402. See Sosa v. Alvarcez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 743, 747 (2004); see also
Ku, supra note 13, at 391 (arguing that the courts misunderstand the
conceptual distinction between CIL and treaty-based international law, and the
court’s over-reliance on domestic cases, in lieu of foreign caselaw, make it
difficult to accurately satisfy Sosa’s “universality” requirement).
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First Congress were unfamiliar with the corporate entity, it
is logical that some judges have strived to interpret ATS
narrowly. Neither courts nor academics have been able to
arrive at a consensus on whether corporate liability is a CIL
norm. Both Kiobel and Rio Tinto follow logically from Sosa’s
mandate to exercise caution in recognizing new causes of
action, and to limit this recognition to discernable, universal
norms of CIL.403 While leaving it up to the courts to
interpret CIL on a case-by-case basis, Sosa cautioned:
“[F]ederal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law
norm with less definite content and acceptance among
civilized nations than the historical paradigms.”404
Alternatively, the Flomo and Exxon courts present a
radically different, but logical approach to defining which
actors can be sued. Nonetheless, the congressional and
historical records shed little light on whether the First
Congress intended to define both the causes of actions and
defendants under ATS through CIL or if it intended federal
common law to define which parties could be properly sued.
While Sosa paved the way for innovative enforcement of
human rights norms, it also opened a Pandora’s box—
granting the judiciary unfettered discretion over ATS claims
and vesting in federal judges, who deal almost entirely with
domestic law, the difficult task of interpreting an
amorphous body of soft law. Aside from the obvious and
demonstrated difficulties in interpreting international law,
recent ATS case law has highlighted the inherent difficulty
in making factual determinations. Judge Kleinfeld’s Rio
Tinto dissent noted that “judicial decisions on entirely
foreign matters are likely to be mistaken because of the
inadequate reliability of factual determinations.”405
403. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28. But see Joel Slawotsky, Corporate Liability
in Alien Tort Litigation, 1 VA. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 27, 42 (2011) http://www.vjil.
org/assets/pdfs/vjilonline1/1/Slawotsky__Post-Production_.pdf (“There is an
absence of support for opining that Sosa mandates an examination of
international law to determine whether corporations may have liability.”).
404. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
405. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 2011 WL 5041927, at * 66 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2011) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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Kleinfeld illustrated that immense language and cultural
barriers can lead to an overreliance on anthropological
experts and give jurors the impossible task of judging what
is right or wrong in a country operating within radically
different historical, legal, and moral paradigms: “The
incapacity of American courts to ascertain facts about what
foreigners did to foreigners in a foreign land, combined with
the amorphousness of the general principles of law to be
applied, can only lead to unreliable, unpredictable, and
unjust results.”406
The courts’ and various scholars’ alternative
interpretations of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s decision to
forego prosecution of the I.G. Farben company is just one
example of the problems that may arise when judges are
given the lofty task of interpreting and defining norms of
international law. Neither historians nor judges have been
able to arrive at a consensus for why I.G. Farben escaped
punishment, when its exploitation of concentration camp
labor and production of deadly chemicals played a direct
role in the deaths of Holocaust victims.407 The Kiobel
majority interpreted this choice as an express rejection of
corporate liability under international law.408 The majority
noted that while twenty-four I.G. Farben executives were
tried for their role in the Holocaust, the corporation was
neither charged nor named in the indictment.409 A group of
Nuremberg Scholars, composed of academicians from law,
history, and political science, filed an amicus brief in Flomo
arguing that the factual premise of Kiobel was inaccurate.410

406. Id.
407. See Ku, supra note 13, at 381-82; see also Gianinni & Farbstein, supra
note 182, at 121 (“The I.G. Farben example clearly illustrates that the
international system can regulate corporate actors operating in conflict zones.”).
408. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 134 (2d Cir.
2010).
409. Id. at 134-35.
410. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nuremberg Scholars Omer Bartov et al. in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Seeking Reversal at 1, Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011) (No. 10–3675), 2011 WL
2452311, at *1.
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Both the Flomo and Exxon courts noted that I.G. Farben
was ordered dissolved and made to pay reparations.411
At oral argument before the Supreme Court in Kiobel,
Ms. Sullivan argued for the Respondent that Nuremberg
established the concept of holding individuals liable for
human rights violations.412 In response, Justice Ginsburg,
noting that Nuremberg dealt with criminal and not civil
liability, asked: “What happened to I.G. Farben? I thought it
was dissolved and its assets taken.”413 Ms. Sullivan replied
that “when I.G. Farben was dissolved, it was part of
denazification, decartelization, and the destruction of the
Nazi war machine of which I.G. Farben was an integral
part.”414 The fact that the debate over the I.G. Farben case
has been so prominent in ATS case law and recent
literature415 is an indicator of the uncertain nature of
corporate ATS litigation in the post-Sosa era. As Judge
Posner conceded, “the relevant evidence of customary
international law is widely dispersed and generally
unfamiliar to lawyers and judges.”416 If courts continue to be
empowered to interpret sources of international law and
conflicting historical records, with no congressional
intervention, ATS jurisprudence will remain inconsistent.
Judge Kleinfeld’s Rio Tinto dissent highlights the
problem of attempting to interpret a statute that lay
dormant for almost 200 years without additional
congressional guidance:
Congress has never given us “a clear mandate” for the wrongs
alleged in the [plaintiffs’] complaint before us [e.g. war crimes,
genocide, racial discrimination]. Sosa did not open the door to our
unconsented entry. The Court suggested that there may be some
international norms that violate the law of nations in addition to

411. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1017; Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11, 52 (D.C.
Cir. 2011).
412. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 9, at 35.
413. Id. at 35.
414. Id. at 36.
415. See sources cited supra note 182.
416. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1015.
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piracy, safe conducts, and assaults against ambassadors, but
warned courts to be cautious in creating new claims.
...
The only wrong the First Congress could have possibly
contemplated as providing for universal jurisdiction would have
been piracy. But imaginative speculation about how legislators in
1789 may have felt about piracy cannot expand the Alien Tort
Statute’s reach to entirely foreign disputes that bear no relation
whatsoever to piracy. Twenty-first-century preferences regarding
universal jurisdiction and war crimes do not shed light on the
417
congressional intent underlying an eighteenth-century statute.

Given the highly contested state of ATS in each circuit
and the cost of such litigation to corporations, human rights
victims, and the judiciary, alike, Congress should step in
and define the scope of ATS. The Supreme Court, itself, in
Sosa, invited a congressional amendment clarifying the
statute: “[W]e would welcome any congressional guidance in
exercising jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect
foreign relations.”418 Judge Posner further stated in Flomo
that ATS “contains no clarifying language” and “since it’s
. . . a statute, Congress could curtail its scope”419 As
Bellinger argues:
Defining causes of action legislatively would lend certainty and
accountability to the litigation—judges would no longer be left to
divine causes of action in the unfamiliar materials of international
law—and such definitions would embody the judgment of
Congress and the President as to the content of international
420
law.

Further, congressional guidance would prevent the
courts from being in the precarious position of adjudicating
public policy concerns. As stated by the district court in

417. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 2011 WL 5041927, at *6 (9th Cir.
Oct. 25, 2011) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
418. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004). The Court went on to
note that, “nothing Congress has done is a reason for us to shut the door to the
law of nations entirely.” Id.
419. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016.
420. Bellinger, supra note 372, at 13.

890

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,421 deciding to impose
corporate liability is “a policy judgment better made by a
legislature than a federal court—that facilitating victim
compensation is more desirable than deterring individual
misconduct.”422 Until Congress amends ATS, the Court
should continue to interpret ATS narrowly.
If Kiobel becomes the law of the land, human rights
activists will not be left without any avenues to curtail bad
corporate conduct. ATS litigation, while undoubtedly a
useful tool, is not necessary to ignite public activism. For
example, after the Coca-Cola case’s dismissal,423 plaintiffs
launched its Campaign to Stop Killer Coke.424 In the wake of
the allegations that the Coca-Cola Company was to blame
for the murders of union members in Colombia, about forty
college campuses boycotted Coke products.425 Other unions,
in a show of solidarity, picketed the company’s April 2002
annual shareholder meeting at Madison Square Garden,
publicly decrying the Coca-Cola Company’s involvement and
calling for tougher labor standards at its global
manufacturing plants, while inside the walls of the arena,
executives assured shareholders that the allegations were

421. In its post-Kiobel decision, the Southern District of Indiana found that
while the court had jurisdiction over corporate ATS claims, international law
does not support a claim of corporate liability, based on the lack of corporate
liability (1) under international criminal, (2) TVPA, and (3) outside of ATS for
tort claims. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810, 817
(S.D. Ind. 2010). Further, Flomo opined that “[r]ecognizing corporate liability
under the ATS would further exacerbate the disparate treatment between
citizens and aliens in American courts and would promote forum shopping.” Id.
at 818.
422. Id. at 817.
423. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1259, 1270 (11th Cir.
2009).
424. See CAMPAIGN
visited Apr. 13, 2012).

TO

STOP KILLER COKE, http://www.killercoke.org (last

425. See, e.g., Dean Foust et al., “Killer Coke” or Innocent Abroad?, BUS. WK.,
Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/06_04/
b3968074.htm; Meg Massey, A Student Backlash Against Coke, TIME, Aug. 9,
2007, http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1651473_1651472
_1651479,00.html.
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false.426 Public outrage over corporate human rights
practices can trigger the political process, encouraging
Congress to implement better regulations of U.S.
corporations’ human rights practices. Additionally, the
United Nations, led by the efforts of special representative
for business and human rights, John Ruggie, is developing
guidelines to help multinational corporations respect
human rights.427 Rather than leaving it up to the American
judiciary to construct rules of international law, the U.N.
and regional human rights systems should strive to create
and impose standards that govern corporations’ business
and human rights practices.
It should be noted that unless prompted by the Supreme
Court’s upcoming decision, a congressional amendment to
ATS might not be politically feasible. Given the current
state of politics, the upcoming presidential election, and the
prominence of budget, economic, tax policy, and healthcare
concerns, to name a few, amending ATS is certainly not a
congressional priority. As the Occupy Wall Street movement
has illustrated, many citizens are disgruntled by corporate
policies, and a proposal to limit corporate liability for
corporations that may have a hand in human rights
violations abroad would undoubtedly be met with
resistance. However, as money equals power in Washington,
corporate lobbies may have more clout over human rights
groups. Moreover, Congress may have no occasion to
address ATS if the Court rules next term that ATS is
unconstitutional as applied extraterritorially.
Some commentators have said that the Court’s request
for reargument in Kiobel foreshadows a watershed decision,
426. Greg Winter, Teamsters Union Protests at Coke Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
18, 2002, at C4.
427. Bellinger, supra note 1; see, e.g., Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps
Toward the Operationalization of the "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework,
¶¶ 44, 62-65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie); Special
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie).
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in which the Court may decide to effectively end modern
ATS litigation by significantly limiting the extraterritorial
application of the statute.428 Adam Liptak of the New York
Times analogized the case to Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission,429 where the Court also requested
reargument.430 In that very controversial case, the Court
“broaden[ed] what had been a quirky case into one that
would give rise to the 2010 campaign finance
blockbluster,”431 and “granted corporations (alongside unions
and other organizations) a First Amendment right to
political speech in allowing them to spend freely in
elections.”432 The order signals that human rights activists
have cause for concern as the Court has opened the door to
ruling that ATS is unconstitutional as applied to claims
between two foreigners in a foreign land, regardless of
whether the defendants are corporate entities or
individuals. Bellinger noted that the Court’s order poses a
Catch-22 problem for the Obama administration in that if it
advocates against the extraterritorial application of ATS, it
would run contrary to the “position of human rights groups
and undercutting its prior argument in favor of corporate
428. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Seeks Clarification on Jurisdiction
in a Human Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A15; John B. Bellinger
III, Stop Press: Supreme Court Orders Kiobel Reargued to Address
Extraterritoriality,
LAWFARE
BLOG
(Mar.
5,
2012,
7:03
PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/stop-press-supreme-court-orders-kiobelreargued-to-address-extraterritoriality/.
429. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
430. Liptak, supra note 428.
431. Id.; see also Lyle Denniston, Kiobel to be Expanded and Reargued,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/
03/kiobel-to-be-reargued/ (“The new order was another, vivid illustration of the
tendency of the ‘Roberts Court’ to take on the broadest kind of controversy in
cases brought to it.”).
432. Michael Bobelian, Corporations Granted Constitutional Rights Should
Bear Responsibility for Their Crimes, FORBES.COM (Feb. 27, 2012, 5:35 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/2012/02/27/corporations-grantedconstitutional-rights-should-bear-responsibility-for-their-crimes/ (“[I]t would be
inequitable for these same justices to find that while corporations can benefit
from the rights, privileges, and protections granted to individuals under the
Constitution, they are exempt from the most basic obligations human beings
owe to each other.”).
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liability.”433 Alternatively, if it argues in favor of
extraterritorial application, it would be taking a position
“contrary to the position of many foreign governments and
inconsistent with international law principles of
jurisdiction,”434 as well as the view of the Bush
administration.
CONCLUSION
While Kiobel is currently an “outlier,” it is difficult to
predict how the Court will ultimately rule. The Court will
likely be divided along ideological lines. If the tone of the
oral arguments before the Court is any indication, Justice
Alito and possibly Chief Justice Roberts may grant
corporate immunity, or determine that ATS is
unconstitutional when applied extraterritorially. Based on
his Sosa opinion, Justice Scalia will most likely vote to
uphold Kiobel or to abolish the extraterritorial application
of ATS altogether.435 Justice Thomas is also likely to side
with his conservative colleagues. Justices Ginsburg, Kagan,
and Sotomayor will likely vote to overturn the Second
Circuit’s ruling. Justice Breyer’s skepticism at the notion
that human rights violators could obtain immunity by
forming a “Pirates, Inc.”-type corporate entity suggests that
he may also vote in favor of corporate liability. Moreover,
Justice Breyer’s recent concurring opinion in Mohamad v.
Palestinian Authority sheds light on this very view.436 In
Mohamad, Justice Breyer noted that while the word
“individual” as used in the TVPA does not encompass
organizations, “individual” in other federal laws could refer
433. Bellinger, supra note 428.
434. Id.
435. See Rich Samp, Will Supreme Court Add Another Alien Tort Statute Case
to Its Docket?, FORBES.COM (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
wlf/2011/11/28/will-supreme-court-add-another-alien-tort-statute-case-to-itsdocket/ (“Given that the Court’s 2004 ATS decision (Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain)
was broadly skeptical of all ATS lawsuits, it is very plausible that a combined
decision this June in Kiobel and Sarei could sound a virtual death knell for such
lawsuits.”).
436. See Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., No. 11-88, slip. op. at 1 (U.S. Apr. 18,
2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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to corporations or other entities.437 As has been the case in
recent years, Justice Kennedy may prove to be the pivotal
swing vote.
Regardless of the result of the Court’s forthcoming
decision, ATS case law will likely continue to be
inconsistent, as courts vary in their interpretation of
international law. Foreign policy concerns, namely
resistance from the executive branch and foreign
governments, may also serve as blockades to future ATS
litigation. Furthermore, presenting ATS cases to American
jurors will present challenges to both counsel and the courts
not often seen in civil litigation. Nonetheless, even if
verdicts in favor of victims continue to be difficult to obtain,
a decision in favor of corporate liability could act as a
substantial deterrent to abhorrent corporate conduct. As
suggested by Kiobel, corporate executives will continue to
face ATS liability; while, “it would be a lot harder to win
those cases, . . . these lawsuits have never been about
winning but about getting a lot of bad publicity about
corporations and building sympathy for the cause plaintiffs
are involved in.”438
Kiobel was once hailed as the end of ATS litigation in
federal courts, but the result of the battle over corporate
liability under the statute remains to be seen. Recent
developments suggest that the judiciary is highly polarized
over how to interpret international law, how to define CIL
norms, and how to properly apply Sosa, as well as the value
of corporate liability in public policymaking. Those with a
stake in ATS litigation should encourage legislators to
address the scope of ATS. Without congressional
intervention, the courts will continue to decide the scope of
international law based on varying interpretations of the
historical record, treaties, and preexisting international
human rights enforcement mechanisms. Until there is a
clear statutory basis for ATS litigation, human rights
activists may continue to expend enormous capital and
437. Id.
438. Marcia Coyle, Will Alien Tort Case Be the Next Citizens United?, NAT’L L.
J. (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1328082
590715.
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manpower, seeking to impose liability on corporations
without any indication that they will successfully recover
damages. In turn, corporations, unguided by Congress, will
continue to expend substantial funds defending these suits
while being wholly unaware of which of their actions are
truly sanctionable under ATS. For now, human rights
activists, and corporate executives, anxiously await the
Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision for a definitive answer on
the future of ATS litigation.

